[Cornell U][CS] 保守信仰与理性

论文： Conservative Belief and Rationality 保守信仰与理性 论文摘要（中文）： http://www.jijitang.com/note/4399?hasLists=false 论文全文（英文）： http://www.cs.cornell.edu/~rafael/papers/cbr.pdf 相关唧唧堂调查主题： 暂无 －－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－ Abstract Brandenburger and Dekel have shown that common belief of rationality (CBR) characterizes rationalizable strategies, which are also characterized by a refinement of subjective correlated equilibrium called a posteriori equilibrium. It is possible that players’ beliefs are incompatible, in the sense that player i can assign probability 1 to an event E to which player j assigns probability 0. One way to block incompatibility is to assume a common prior. We consider here a different approach: we require players’ beliefs to be conservative, in the sense that all players must ascribe the actual world positive probability. Aumann has shown that, under the common prior assumption (CPA), common belief of rationality characterizes strategies in the support of an objective correlated equilibrium. Under the CPA, without loss of generality, all players’ beliefs can be assumed to be conservative. We consider the consequences of common convervative belief of rationality (CCBR), without the common prior assumption. We show that CCBR characterizes strategies in the support of a subjective correlated equilibrium where all players’ beliefs have common support. We also define a notion of strong rationalizability, and show that this is characterized by CCBR. 论文摘要 Brandenburger和Dekel表明理性的共同信念（CBR）和所谓后验均衡的主观相关均衡的完善描绘了理性化策略。这可能是玩家信仰是不相容的，在该意义上，玩家i可以将概率1分配给事件E，而参与者分配给它概率0。阻止不相容性的一种方法是假设一个普通先验。我们在此考虑不同的方法：我们要求玩家持有保守信念，在此意义上所有玩家必须归因于现实世界的实证概率。Aumann已经表明，根据普遍先验假设（CPA），理性的共同信念在基于目标相关均衡的支持下描绘了策略。在不失普遍性的普遍先验假设下（CPA），所有玩家的信念都可以假设为保守。在无共同先验假设下，我们考虑了理性的共同保守信念（CCBR）的后果。我们表明CCBR基于主观相关均衡的支持下描绘了策略，其中所有玩家的信念都具有共同支持。我们还定义了强理性化概念并且表明它由CCBR所描绘。 －－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－ 唧唧堂调查：