* Out of Control: 5.5 Cooperation without friendship or foresight 《失控》5.5 不讲交情、无远见的合作
* Out of Control: 5.5 Cooperation without friendship or foresight 《失控》5.5 不讲交情、无远见的合作
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The trouble with Gaia, as far as most skeptics are concerned, is that
it makes a dead planet into a "smart" machine.
对于多数怀疑论者说来，盖亚的麻烦在于将一个非活物的星球看作是一部“聪明
的”机器。
We already are stymied in trying to design an artificial learning
machine from inert computers, so the prospect of artificial learning
evolving unbidden at a planetary scale seems ludicrous.
我们曾试图将毫无生气的计算机设计成人工学习机器，但却遭受了挫折。因此，
在行星尺度内展开头绪纷乱的人工学习，其前景似乎挺荒谬。
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But learning is overrated as something difficult to evolve.
This may have to do with our chauvinistic attachment to learning as an
exclusive mark of our species.
但实际上我们高估了学习，把它当成一件难事，这与我们的沙文主义情节——把学
习当成是人类特有的能力——不无关系。
There is a strong sense, which I hope to demonstrate in this book, in
which evolution itself is a type of learning.
在本书中，我想要表述一种强烈的看法，即进化本身就是一种学习。
Therefore learning occurs wherever evolution is, even if artificially.
因此，凡有进化（哪怕是人工进化）的地方就会有学习。
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The dethronement of learning is one of the most exciting intellectual
frontiers we are now crossing.
将学习行为拉下神坛，是我们正在跨越的最激动人心的知识前沿之一。
In a virtual cyclotron, learning is being smashed into its primitives.
在一个虚拟的回旋加速器里，学习正被撞裂成为基本粒子。
Scientists are cataloguing the elemental components for adaptation,
induction, intelligence, evolution, and coevolution into a periodic
table of life.
科学家们正在为适应、归纳、智能、进化、共同进化等事物的基本成分编目造
册，使之成为一个生命的元素周期表。
The particles for learning lie everywhere in all inert media, waiting
to be assembled (and often self-assembled) into something that surges
and quivers.
学习所需的各种粒子藏身于所有迟钝的介质当中，等待着被组装（并往往自行组
装）成奔涌灵动的事物。
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Coevolution is a variety of learning.
共同进化就是多种形式的学习。
Stewart Brand wrote in CoEvolution Quarterly: "Ecology is a whole
system, alright, but coevolution is a whole system in time.
斯图尔特•布兰德在《共同进化季刊》中写道：“没错，生态系统是一个完整系
统，而共同进化则是一个时间意义上的完整系统。
The health of it is forward-systemic self-education which feeds on
constant imperfection.
它在常态下是向前推进的、系统化的自我教育，并从不断改正错误中汲取营养。
Ecology maintains. Coevolution learns."
如果说生态系统是在维持的话，那么共同进化则是在学习。”
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Colearning might be a better term for what coevolving creatures do.
Coteaching also works, for the participants in coevolution are both
learning and teaching each other at the same time.
生物的共同进化行为也许可以用一个更好的术语来描述——共同学习，或者共同传
授也行，因为共同进化的各方在相互学习的同时也在相互传授。
(We don't have a word for learning and teaching at the same time, but
our schooling would improve if we did.)
（我们没有恰当的字眼来表述同时施教与受教［1］，但假如做到了教学相长，我
们的学校教育将会得到改善。）
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The give and take of a coevolutionary relationship-teaching and
learning at once-reminded many scientists of game playing.
一个共同进化关系中的施与受——同时施教与受教——
使许多科学家想到了玩游戏。
A simple child's game such as "Which hand is the penny in?" takes on
the recursive logic of a chameleon on a mirror as the hider goes
through this open-ended routine: "I just hid the penny in my right
hand, and now the guesser will think it's in my left, so I'll move it
into my right.
简单的儿童游戏如“哪只手里有钢镚儿？”具有“镜子上的变色龙”般的递归逻辑。
藏钢镚儿的人进入这样一个无止境的过程：“我刚才把钢镚儿藏在右手里，那么现
在猜的人会认为它在我的左手，因此，我要把它移到右手。
But she also knows that I know she knows that, so I'll keep it in my
left."
但她也知道我知道她会怎么想，于是，我还是把它留在左手里。”
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Since the guesser goes through a similar process, the players form a
system of mutual second-guessing.
由于猜的人的思考过程也是如此，双方就构成了一个相互预测对方意图的游戏。
The riddle "What hand is the penny in?" is related to the riddle,
"What color is the chameleon on a mirror?" The bottomless complexity
which grows out of such simple rules intrigued John von Neumann, the
mathematician who developed programmable logic for a computer in the
early 1940s, and along with Wiener and Bateson launched the field of
cybernetics.
“哪只手里有钢镚儿”的谜题和“镜子上的变色龙是什么颜色”的谜题相关联。从这
类简单的规则衍生出的无限复杂性令约翰•冯•诺依曼（1）非常感兴趣。在二十世
纪四十年代早期，这位数学家就研发出用于计算机的可编程逻辑，并同维纳和贝
特森一起开辟了控制论的新领域。
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Von Neumann invented a mathematical theory of games.
冯•诺依曼发明了与游戏有关的数学理论。
He defined a game as a conflict of interests resolved by the
accumulative choices players make while trying to anticipate each
other.
他将游戏定义为一场利益冲突，游戏各方都试图预测其他方的举动，并采取一系
列的步骤，以解决冲突。
He called his 1944 book (coauthored by economist Oskar Morgenstern)
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior because he perceived that
economies possessed a highly coevolutionary and gamelike character,
which he hoped to illuminate with simple game dynamics.
1944年，他与经济学家奥斯卡•摩根斯特恩（2）合写了一本书——《博弈论与经济
行为》［2］。 他察觉到，经济具有高度共同进化和类似游戏的特性，而他希望
以简单的游戏动力学来阐释它。
The price of eggs, say, is determined by mutual second-guessing
between seller and buyer-how much will he accept, how much does he
think I will offer, how much less than what I am willing to pay should
I offer? The aspect von Neumann found amazing was that this infinite
regress of mutual bluffing, codeception, imitation, reflection, and
"game playing" would commonly settle down to a definite price, rather
than spiral on forever.
举例说，鸡蛋的价格取决于卖方和买方彼此之间的预期猜测——我出价多少他才能
够接受，他认为我会出多少，我的出价应该比我能承受的价位低多少？令冯•诺依
曼惊讶的是，这种相互欺诈、相互蒙骗、效仿、映像以及“博弈”的无休止递归一
般都能够落实到一个明确的价格上，而不是无限纠缠下去。
Even in a stock market made of thousands of mutual second-guessing
agents, the group of conflicting interests would quickly settle on a
price that was fairly stable.
即使在股市上，当有成千上万的代理在玩着相互预测的游戏时，利益冲突的各方
也能迅速达成一个还算稳定的价格。
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Von Neumann was particularly interested in seeing if he could develop
optimal strategies for these kinds of mutual games, because at first
glance they seemed almost insolvable in theory.
冯•诺依曼最感兴趣的是想看看自己能否给这种互动游戏找出最理想的策略，因为
乍一看来，它们在理论上几乎是无解的。
As an answer he came up with a theory of games.
于是他提出了博弈论作为解答。
Researchers at the U.S. government-funded RAND corporation, a think
tank based in Santa Monica, California, extended von Neumann's initial
work and eventually catalogued four basic varieties of mutual
second-guessing games.
位于加利福尼亚州圣塔莫妮卡市（Santa Monica）的兰德公司是美国政府资助的
智库。那里的研究人员发展了冯•诺依曼的工作，最后列出了四种有关相互猜测游
戏的基本变体。
Each variety had a different structure of rewards for winning, losing,
or drawing.
每一个变体各有不同的输赢或平局的奖励结构。
The four simple games were called "social dilemmas" in the technical
literature, but could be thought of as the four building blocks of
complicated coevolutionary games.
这四个简单的游戏在技术文献中统称为“社会困境”（social dilemmas）， 但又
可以被看作是构造复杂共同进化游戏的四块积木。
They were: Chicken, Stag Hunt, Deadlock, and the Prisoner's Dilemma
这四个基本变体是：草鸡博弈、猎鹿博弈、僵局，以及囚徒困境。
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Chicken is the game played by teenage daredevils.
“草鸡博弈”是供鲁莽的青少年玩的游戏。
Two cars race toward a cliff's edge; the driver who jumps out last,
wins.
两辆赛车朝悬崖边奔去；后摔出来的司机是赢家。
Stag Hunt is the dilemma faced by a bunch of hunters who must
cooperate to kill a stag, but may do better sneaking off by themselves
to hunt a rabbit if no one cooperates.
“猎鹿”是一群猎手面对的难题，他们必须合作才能把鹿杀死， 如果没有人合作的
话，那么开小差各自去撵兔子会更好些。
Do they gamble on cooperation (high payoff) or defection (low, but
sure payoff)?
他们是在赌合作（高回报）还是背叛（低，但是肯定有回报）吗？
Deadlock is a boring game where mutual defection pays best.
“僵局”是挺无聊的游戏，彼此背叛收益最高。
The last one, the Prisoner's Dilemma, is the most illuminating, and
became the guinea pig model for over 200 published social psychology
experiments in the late 1960s.
最后一个“囚徒困境”最有启发性，在1960年代末成为两百多例社会心理学实验的
测试模型。
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The Prisoner's Dilemma, invented in 1950 by Merrill Flood at RAND, is
a game for two separately held prisoners who must independently decide
whether to deny or confess to a crime.
“囚徒困境”是由兰德公司的梅里尔•弗拉德（3）于1950年设计出来的。游戏中，
两个分别关押的囚犯必须独立决定否认还是坦白罪行。
If both confess, each will be fined. If neither confesses, both go
free.
如果两人都认罪，那么两人都会受到惩罚。如果两人都否认的话，则都会被无罪
释放。
But if only one should confess, he is rewarded while the other is
fined.
但假如只有一人认罪，那么他就会得到奖励，而另一个则受到惩罚［3］。
Cooperation pays, but so does betrayal, if played right. What would
you do?
合作有回报，但如果策略奏效的话，背叛也有回报。你该怎么办呢？
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Played only once, betrayal of the other is the soundest choice.
如果只玩一次，背叛对手是最合理的选择。
But when two "prisoners" played the game over and over, learning from
each other-a game known as the Iterated Prisoner Dilemma-the dynamics
of the game shifted.
但当两个“囚徒”一次又一次地玩，从中相互学习——也即“重复的［4］囚徒困境”——游
戏的推演就发生了变化。
The other player could not be dismissed; he demanded to be attended
to, either as obligate enemy or obligate colleague.
你不能无视对手玩家的存在；不论是作为强制的敌手还是同伙，他都必须受到重
视［5］。
This tight mutual destiny closely paralleled the coevolutionary
relationship of political enemies, business competitors, or biological
symbionts.
这种紧密相连的共同命运与政敌之间、生意对手之间或者生态共生体之间的共同
进化关系非常类似。
As study of this simple game progressed, the larger question became,
What were the strategies of play for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
that resulted in the highest scores over the long term?
随着对这个简单游戏的研究的进一步深入，问题变成了：要想在长期内取得高
分，面对“重复的囚徒困境”应该采取什么样的策略？
And what strategies succeeded when played against many varieties of
players, from the ruthless to the kind?
还有，同无情或友善的各类玩家对垒时，该采取什么样的策略更容易取得成功呢？
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In 1980, Robert Axelrod, a political science professor at University
of Michigan, ran a tournament pitting 14 submitted strategies of
Prisoner's Dilemma against each other in a round robin to see which
one would triumph.
1980年，密歇根大学政治学教授罗伯特•阿克塞尔罗德（4）组织了一次锦标赛，
征集了14条不同的用于“囚徒困境”的对策，以循环赛的形式看哪个对策最后胜出。
The winner was a very simple strategy crafted by psychologist Anatol
Rapoport called Tit-For-Tat.
最后获胜的是一个最简单的对策，叫做“一报还一报”（Tit-For-Tat），由心理学
家阿纳托•拉帕波特（Anatol Rapoport）（5）设计。
The Tit-For-Tat strategy prescribed reciprocating cooperation for
cooperation, and defection for defection, and tended to engender
periods of cooperation.
“一报还一报”是往复型策略，它以合作回报合作，以背叛回报背叛，往往产生一
轮轮合作的周期。
Axelrod had discovered that "the shadow of the future," cast by
playing a game repeatedly rather than once, encouraged cooperation,
because it made sense for a player to cooperate now in order to ensure
cooperation from others later.
阿克塞尔罗德发现，重复游戏能产生一次性游戏所不具备的“未来阴影”之效果，
这种效果鼓励合作，因为对玩家来说，用现在对他人予以的合作来换取今后他人
给予的合作是一个合理的选择。
This glimpse of cooperation set Axelrod on this quest: "Under what
conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without
central authority?"
合作的闪现使阿克塞尔罗德陷入沉思：“没有中央集权的自我主义世界需要具备什
么条件才能浮现出合作的行为？”
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For centuries, the orthodox political reasoning originally articulated
by Thomas Hobbes in 1651 was dogma: that cooperation could only
develop with the help of a benign central authority.
1651年，托马斯•霍布斯（Thomas Hobbes） 宣称：只有在善意的中央集权帮助下
才能产生合作。这一传统政治推论曾经在几个世纪里一直被奉为圭臬。
Without top-down government, Hobbes claimed, there would be only
collective selfishness.
霍布斯断言，没有自上而下的管理，就只会有群体自私。
A strong hand had to bring forth political altruism, whatever the tone
of economics.
不管经济体制如何，必须有强大的势力来推行政治利他主义。
But the democracies of the West, beginning with the American and
French Revolutions, suggested that societies with good communications
could develop cooperative structures without heavy central control.
然而，在美国独立和法国革命后逐步建立起来的西方民主制度表明，民意通达的
社会可以在没有中央集权强力干预的情况下发展合作机制。
Cooperation can emerge out of self-interest. In our postindustrial
economy, spontaneous cooperation is a regular occurrence.
个人利益也能孕育出合作。在后工业化经济里，自发合作是常有的事情。
Widespread industry-initiated standards (both of quality and protocols
such as 110 volts or ASCII) and the rise of the Internet, the largest
working anarchy in the world, have only intensified interest in the
conditions necessary for hatching coevolutionary cooperation.
被广泛采用的工业标准（既有质量方面的，也有协议方面的，如 110伏电压，还
有ASCII码［6］），以及因特网这个世界上最大的无政府形态的兴起，都使得人
们更加关注孕育共同进化合作所需的必要条件。
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This cooperation is not a new age spiritualism.
这种合作不是新时代的精神至上主义。
Rather it is what Axelrod calls "cooperation without friendship or
foresight"-cold principles of nature that work at many levels to birth
a self-organizing structure.
相反，如阿克塞尔罗德所说，这是一种“不讲交情、无需远见的合作”——是大自然
的冷规则，适用于许多层面，并催生了自组织结构。
Sort of cooperation whether you want it or not.
不管你愿不愿意，多少都得合作。
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Games such as Prisoner's Dilemma can be played by any kind of adaptive
agent-not just humans.
“囚徒困境”这类游戏，不单只人类，任何自适应个体都可以玩。
Bacteria, armadillos, or computer transistors can make choices
according to various reward schemes, weighing immediate sure gain over
future greater but riskier gain.
细菌，犰狳，或是计算机里的半导体器件，都可以根据各种回报机制，在眼前的
稳妥收获与未来的高风险高回报之间做出权衡。
Played over time with the same partners, the results are both a game
and a type of coevolution.
当长时间与相同的伙伴一起玩这个游戏时，双方既是在博弈，又是在进行某种类
型的共同进化。
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Every complex adaptive organization faces a fundamental tradeoff.
每一个复杂的自适应组织都面临着基本的权衡。
A creature must balance perfecting a skill or trait (building up legs
to run faster) against experimenting with new traits (wings).
生物必须在完善现有技能、特质（练腿力以便跑得更快）与尝试新特质（翅膀）
之间作取舍。
It can never do all things at once. This daily dilemma is labeled the
tradeoff between exploration and exploitation.
它不可能同时做所有的事情。这种每天都会碰到的难题便属于在开发和利用之间
作权衡。
Axelrod makes an analogy with a hospital: "On average you can expect a
new medical drug to have a lower payoff than exploiting an established
medication to its limits.
阿克塞尔罗德用医院作了一个类比：“一般情况下你可以想见试用某种新药比尽可
能发掘已有成药的疗效回报来得低。
But if you gave every patient the current best drug, you'd never get
proven new drugs.
但假如你给所有病人用的都是目前最好的成药，你就永远无法验证新药的疗效。
From an individual's point of view you should never do the
exploration.
从病人个人角度来讲最好不要试用新药。
But from the society of individuals' point of view, you ought to try
some experiments." How much to explore (gain for the future) versus
how much to exploit (sure bet now) is the game a hospital has to play.
但从社会集合体的角度出发，做实验是必要的。”开发（未来收益）与利用（目前
稳赢的筹码）之比应该是多少，这是医院不得不作的博弈。
Living organisms have a similar tradeoff in deciding how much mutation
and innovation is needed to keep up with a changing environment.
生命有机体为了跟上环境的变化，在决定应该在多大程度上进行变异和创新时，
也会作出类似的权衡。
When they play the tradeoff against a sea of other creatures making
similar tradeoffs, it becomes a coevolutionary game.
当海量的生物都在做着类似的权衡并且互相影响时，就形成一个共同进化的博弈
游戏。
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Axelrod's 14-player Prisoner's Dilemma round robin tournament was
played on a computer.
阿克塞尔罗德发起的、有14位玩家参与的“囚徒困境”循环锦标赛是在电脑上进行
的。
In 1987, Axelrod extended the computerization of the game by setting
up a system in which small populations of programs played randomly
generated Prisoner's Dilemma strategies.
1987年，阿克塞尔罗德通过设定一套系统拓展了这个电脑游戏。 在系统里，有一
小群程序玩家执行随机产生的“囚徒困境”策略。
Each random strategy would be scored after a round of playing against
all the other strategies running; the ones with the highest scores got
copied the most to the next generation, so that the most successful
strategies propagated.
每个随机策略在和所有其它运行中的策略对阵一圈之后被打分，得分最高的策略
在下一代的复制率最高，于是最成功的策略便得以繁衍和传播。
Because many strategies could succeed only by "preying" on other
strategies, they would thrive only as long as their prey survived.
许多策略都是通过“捕食”其他策略来取胜的，因而，只有当猎物能存活时，这些
策略才能兴旺发达。
This leads to the oscillating dynamics found everywhere in the wilds
of nature; how fox and hare populations rise and fall over the years
in coevolutionary circularity.
这就导出了自然界荒野中俯拾皆是的生物数量呈周期性波动的机理，说明了狐狸
和兔子的数量在年复一年的共同进化的循环中是如何起起落落的。
When the hares increase the foxes boom; when the foxes boom, the hares
die off.
兔子数量增，狐狸繁殖多；狐狸繁殖多，兔子死翘翘。
But when there are no hares, the foxes starve. When there are less
foxes, the hares increase.
但是没有了兔子，狐狸就得饿死。狐狸数量少了，兔子数量就多了。
And when the hares increase the foxes do too, and so on.
兔子多了，狐狸也就多了，以此类推。
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In 1990, Kristian Lindgren, working at the Neils Bohr Institute in
Copenhagen, expanded these coevolutionary experiments by increasing
the population of players to 1,000, introducing random noise into the
games, and letting this artificial coevolution run for up to 30,000
generations.
1990年，在哥本哈根尼尔斯波尔研究院工作的克里斯蒂安•林德格雷（7）将这个
共同进化实验的玩家数扩展到一千，同时引入随机干扰，并使这个人工共同进化
过程可以繁衍到三万世代之后。
Lindgren found that masses of dumb agents playing Prisoner's Dilemma
not only reenacted the ecological oscillations of fox and hare, but
the populations also created many other natural phenomenon such as
parasitism, spontaneously emerging symbiosis, and long-term stable
coexistence between species, as if they were an ecology.
林德格雷发现，由众多参与“囚徒困境”游戏的愚钝个体所组成的群体不但重现了
狐狸和兔子数量的生态波动，也产生出许多其他自然现象，如寄生、自发涌现的
共生共栖，以及物种间长期稳定的共存关系等，就如同一整套生态系统。
Lindgren's work excited some biologists because his very long runs
displayed long periods when the mix of different "species" of strategy
was very stable.
林德格雷的工作让一些生物学家兴奋不已，因为在他的漫长回合博弈游戏中出现
了一个又一个的周期。每个周期的持续时间都很长；而在一个周期内，由不同策
略的“物种”所形成的混合维持着非常稳定的状态。
These historical epochs were interrupted by very sudden, short-lived
episodes of instability, when old species went extinct and new ones
took root.
然 而，这些盛世都被一些突发、短命的不稳定插曲所打断，于是旧的物种灭绝，
新的物种生根。
Quickly a new stable arrangement of new species of strategies arose
and persisted for many thousands of generations.
持新策略的物种间迅速达成新的稳定，又持续发展数千代。
This motif matches the general pattern of evolution found in earthly
fossils, a pattern known in the evolutionary trade as punctuated
equilibrium, or "punk eek" for short.
这个模式与从早期化石里发现的进化的常见模式相契合，该模式在进化论业界里
叫做间断平衡（punctuated equilibrium）［7］，或简称为“蹦移（punk
eek）”。
----------------------------------------------------------
One marvelous result from these experiments bears consideration by
anyone hoping to manage coevolutionary forces.
这些实验得出了一个了不起的结果，令所有希望驾驭共同进化力量的人都为之瞩
目。
It's another law of the gods. It turns out that no matter what clever
strategy you engineer or evolve in a world laced by
chameleon-on-a-mirror loops, if it is applied as a perfectly pure rule
that you obey absolutely, it will not be evolutionary resilient to
competing strategies.
这是众神的另一条律法：在一个饰以“镜子上的变色龙”式的叠套花环的世界里，
无论你设计或演变出怎样高妙的策略，如果你绝对服从它，为它所用，从进化的
角度来看，这个策略就无法与其他具竞争力的策略相抗衡。
That is, a competing strategy will figure out how to exploit your rule
in the long run.
也即是说，如何在持久战中让规则为你所用才是一个具竞争力的策略。
A little touch of randomness (mistakes, imperfections), on the other
hand, actually creates long-term stability in coevolutionary worlds by
allowing some strategies to prevail for relative eons by not being so
easily aped.
另一方面，引入少许的随机因素（如差错、缺陷）反而能够在共同进化的世界里
缔造出长久的稳定，因为这样一来某些策略无法被轻易地“山寨”，从而能够在相
对长的时期里占据统治地位。
Without noise-wholly unexpected and out-of-character choices-the
opportunity for escalating evolution is lost because there are not
enough periods of stability to keep the system going.
没有了干扰——即出乎意料或是反常的选择——就没有足够多的稳定周期来维持系统
的发展，逐步升级的进化也就失去了机会。
Error keeps the glue of coevolutionary relationships from binding too
tightly into runaway death spirals, and therefore error keeps a
coevolutionary system afloat and moving forward. Honor thy error.
错误能使共同进化关系不致因为胶着太紧而陷入自沉的漩涡，从而保持共同进化
的系统顺流前行。向你的错误致敬吧。
----------------------------------------------------------
Playing coevolutionary games in computers has provided other lessons.
在电脑中进行的这些共同进化游戏还提供了另外的教益。
One of the few notions from game theory to penetrate the popular
culture was the distinction of zero-sum and nonzero-sum games.
零和与非零和游戏的区别是少数几个渗透到大众文化中的博弈论理念之一。
Chess, elections, races, and poker are zero-sum games: the winner's
earnings are deducted from the loser's assets.
象棋、选举、赛跑和扑克是零和游戏：赢家的收益取自输家的损失。
Natural wilderness, the economy, a mind, and networks on the other
hand, are nonzero-sum games. Wolverines don't have to lose just
because bears live.
自然界的荒野、经济、思维意识、网络则属于非零和游戏：熊的存在并不意味狼
獾会失败。
The highly connected loops of coevolutionary conflict mean the whole
can reward (or at times cripple) all members.
共同进化中的冲突环环相扣、 彼此关联，意味着整体收益可以惠及（有时殃及）
所有成员。
Axelrod told me, "One of the earliest and most important insights from
game theory was that nonzero-sum games had very different strategic
implications than zero-sum games.
阿克塞尔罗德告诉我， “来自博弈论最早也是最重要的洞见之一就是，非零和游
戏的战略内涵与零和游戏的战略内涵截然不同。
In zero-sum games whatever hurts the other guy is good for you. In
nonzero-sum games you can both do well, or both do poorly.
零和游戏中对他人的任何伤害都对你有好处。在非零和游戏 中，你们可能共荣，
也可能同衰。
I think people often take a zero-sum view of the world when they
shouldn't.
我认为，人们常用零和游戏的观点看世界，其实他们本不该这样。
They often say, 'Well I'm doing better than the other guy, therefore I
must be doing well.' In a nonzero-sum you could be doing better than
the other guy and both be doing terribly."
他们常说：“我比别人做得好，所以我就该发达。”而在非零和 游戏里，尽管你比
别人做得好，你也可能和他一样潦倒。”
----------------------------------------------------------
Axelrod noticed that the champion Tit-For-Tat strategy always won
without exploiting an opponent's strategy-it merely mirrored the
other's actions.
阿克塞尔罗德注意到，作为赢家，“一报还一报”策略从不琢磨利用对手的策略——
它只是以其人之道还治其人之身。
Tit-For-Tat could not beat anyone's strategy one on one, but in a
nonzero-sum game it would still win a tournament because it had the
highest cumulative score when played against many kinds of rules.
在一对一的对决中，该策略并不能胜过任何一个其他策略；但在非零和游戏中，
它却能够在跟许多策略对抗的过程中取得最高累积分，从而夺得锦标。
As Axelrod pointed out to William Poundstone, author of Prisoner's
Dilemma, "That's a very bizarre idea.
正如阿克塞尔罗德向“囚徒困境”的始作俑者威廉• 庞德斯通（8）指出的：“这个
理念太不可思议了。
You can't win a chess tournament by never beating anybody." But with
coevolution-change changing in response to itself-you can win without
beating others.
下棋时怎么可能不击败任何一个对手就夺得锦标呢？”但是在共同进化中——变化是
响应自身而变化——不用打击他人就能赢。
Hard-nosed CEOs in the business world now recognize that in the era of
networks and alliances, companies can make billions without beating
others. Win-win, the cliché is called.
企业界那些精明的首席执行官们现在也承认，在网络和结盟的时代，公司犯不着
打击他人就可以大把地赚钱。这个就是所谓的双赢。
----------------------------------------------------------
Win-win is the story of life in coevolution.
双赢是共同进化模式下生命所演绎的故事。
----------------------------------------------------------
Sitting in his book-lined office, Robert Axelrod mused on the
consequences of understanding coevolution and then added, "I hope my
work on the evolution of cooperation helps the world avoid conflict.
坐在堆满书籍的办公室里，罗伯特•阿克塞尔罗德还沉浸在对共同进化的理解和思
考中。
If you read the citation which the National Academy of Science gave
me," he said pointing to a plaque on the wall, "they think it helped
avoid nuclear war."
然后他补充道：“希望我在合作进化方面的工作有助于避免世界冲突。你看过国家
科学院给我的奖状没有，”他指着墙上的一块牌匾说，“他们认为它有助于避免核
战争。”
Although von Neumann was a key figure in the development of the atom
bomb, he did not formally apply his own theories to the gamelike
politics of the nuclear arms race.
尽管冯•诺依曼是发展原子弹的关键人物，但他并没有将他的理论明确地应用于核
军备竞赛的政治游戏。
But after von Neumann's death in 1957, strategists in military think
tanks began using his game theory to analyze the cold war, which had
taken on the flavor of a coevolutionary "obligate cooperation" between
two superpower enemies.
在 1957年冯•诺依曼逝世之后，军事战略智囊团开始利用他的博弈论分析冷战，
冷战中两个相互为敌的超级大国带有共同进化关系中“强制合作”的意味。
Gorbachev had a fundamental coevolutionary insight, says Axelrod. "He
saw that the Soviets could get more security with fewer tanks rather
than with more tanks.
戈尔巴乔夫具有基本的共同进化洞察力。阿尔塞德罗说，“他看到，减少而不是增
加坦克数量会让苏联更安全。
Gorbi unilaterally threw away 10,000 tanks, and that made it harder
for US and Europe to have a big military budget, which helped get this
whole process going that ended the cold war."
他单方面裁掉了一万辆坦克，使得美国和欧洲更难有借口保持大规模的军事预
算，借此全面展开了结束冷战的进程。”
----------------------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most useful lesson of coevolution for "wannabe" gods is
that in coevolutionary worlds control and secrecy are
counterproductive.
对于“伪神们”［8］来说，从共同进化中获得的最有用的教训就是，在共同进化的
世界里，控制和保密只能帮倒忙。
You can't control, and revelation works better than concealment.
你无法控制，而开诚布公比遮遮掩掩效果更好。
"In zero-sum games you always try to hide your strategy," says
Axelrod.
“在零和游戏中你总想隐藏自己的策略，”阿克塞尔罗德说。
"But in nonzero-sum games you might want to announce your strategy in
public so the other players need to adapt to it."
“但在非零和游戏中，你可能会将策略公之于众，这样一来，别的玩家就必须适应
它。”
Gorbachev's strategy was effective because he did it publicly;
unilaterally withdrawing in secret would have done nothing.
戈尔巴乔夫的策略之所以有效，是因为他公开实施了这个策略；如果只是秘密地
单方面削减武器则会一事无成。
----------------------------------------------------------
The chameleon on the mirror is a completely open system. Neither the
lizard nor the glass has any secrets.
镜子上的变色龙是一个完全开放的系统。无论是蜥蜴还是玻璃，都没有任何秘密。
The grand closure of Gaia keeps cycling because all its lesser cycles
inform each other in constant coevolutionary communication.
盖亚的大封闭圈里循环不断，是因为其中所有的小循环都在不断的共同进化沟通
中互相交流。
From the collapse of Soviet command-style economies, we know that open
information keeps an economy stable and growing.
从苏联指令式计划经济的崩溃中我们了解到，公开的信息能够保持经济的稳定和
增长。
----------------------------------------------------------
Coevolution can be seen as two parties snared in the web of mutual
propaganda.
共同进化可以看作是双方陷入相互传教的网络。
Coevolutionary relationships, from parasites to allies, are in their
essence informational.
共同进化的关系，从寄生到结盟，从本质上来讲都具有信息的属性。
A steady exchange of information welds them into a single system.
稳步的信息交流将它们焊接成一个单一的 系统。
At the same time, the exchange-whether of insults or assistance or
plain news-creates a commons from which cooperation,
self-organization, and win-win endgames can spawn.
与此同时，信息交流——无论是侮辱、还是帮助，抑或只是普通新闻——都为合作、
自组织，以及双赢结局的破土发芽开辟了园地。
----------------------------------------------------------
In the Network Era-that age we have just entered-dense communication
is creating artificial worlds ripe for emergent coevolution,
spontaneous self-organization, and win-win cooperation.
在我们刚刚迈入的网络时代中，频繁的交流正在创造日益成熟的人工世界，为共
同进化、自发的自组织以及双赢合作的涌现而准备着。
In this Era, openness wins, central control is lost, and stability is
a state of perpetual almost-falling ensured by constant error.
在这个时代，开放者赢，中央控制者输，而稳定，则是由持续的误差所保证的一
种永久临跌状态。
----------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------
The trouble with Gaia, as far as most skeptics are concerned, is that
it makes a dead planet into a "smart" machine.
对于多数怀疑论者说来，盖亚的麻烦在于将一个非活物的星球看作是一部“聪明
的”机器。
We already are stymied in trying to design an artificial learning
machine from inert computers, so the prospect of artificial learning
evolving unbidden at a planetary scale seems ludicrous.
我们曾试图将毫无生气的计算机设计成人工学习机器，但却遭受了挫折。因此，
在行星尺度内展开头绪纷乱的人工学习，其前景似乎挺荒谬。
----------------------------------------------------------
But learning is overrated as something difficult to evolve.
This may have to do with our chauvinistic attachment to learning as an
exclusive mark of our species.
但实际上我们高估了学习，把它当成一件难事，这与我们的沙文主义情节——把学
习当成是人类特有的能力——不无关系。
There is a strong sense, which I hope to demonstrate in this book, in
which evolution itself is a type of learning.
在本书中，我想要表述一种强烈的看法，即进化本身就是一种学习。
Therefore learning occurs wherever evolution is, even if artificially.
因此，凡有进化（哪怕是人工进化）的地方就会有学习。
----------------------------------------------------------
The dethronement of learning is one of the most exciting intellectual
frontiers we are now crossing.
将学习行为拉下神坛，是我们正在跨越的最激动人心的知识前沿之一。
In a virtual cyclotron, learning is being smashed into its primitives.
在一个虚拟的回旋加速器里，学习正被撞裂成为基本粒子。
Scientists are cataloguing the elemental components for adaptation,
induction, intelligence, evolution, and coevolution into a periodic
table of life.
科学家们正在为适应、归纳、智能、进化、共同进化等事物的基本成分编目造
册，使之成为一个生命的元素周期表。
The particles for learning lie everywhere in all inert media, waiting
to be assembled (and often self-assembled) into something that surges
and quivers.
学习所需的各种粒子藏身于所有迟钝的介质当中，等待着被组装（并往往自行组
装）成奔涌灵动的事物。
----------------------------------------------------------
Coevolution is a variety of learning.
共同进化就是多种形式的学习。
Stewart Brand wrote in CoEvolution Quarterly: "Ecology is a whole
system, alright, but coevolution is a whole system in time.
斯图尔特•布兰德在《共同进化季刊》中写道：“没错，生态系统是一个完整系
统，而共同进化则是一个时间意义上的完整系统。
The health of it is forward-systemic self-education which feeds on
constant imperfection.
它在常态下是向前推进的、系统化的自我教育，并从不断改正错误中汲取营养。
Ecology maintains. Coevolution learns."
如果说生态系统是在维持的话，那么共同进化则是在学习。”
----------------------------------------------------------
Colearning might be a better term for what coevolving creatures do.
Coteaching also works, for the participants in coevolution are both
learning and teaching each other at the same time.
生物的共同进化行为也许可以用一个更好的术语来描述——共同学习，或者共同传
授也行，因为共同进化的各方在相互学习的同时也在相互传授。
(We don't have a word for learning and teaching at the same time, but
our schooling would improve if we did.)
（我们没有恰当的字眼来表述同时施教与受教［1］，但假如做到了教学相长，我
们的学校教育将会得到改善。）
----------------------------------------------------------
The give and take of a coevolutionary relationship-teaching and
learning at once-reminded many scientists of game playing.
一个共同进化关系中的施与受——同时施教与受教——
使许多科学家想到了玩游戏。
A simple child's game such as "Which hand is the penny in?" takes on
the recursive logic of a chameleon on a mirror as the hider goes
through this open-ended routine: "I just hid the penny in my right
hand, and now the guesser will think it's in my left, so I'll move it
into my right.
简单的儿童游戏如“哪只手里有钢镚儿？”具有“镜子上的变色龙”般的递归逻辑。
藏钢镚儿的人进入这样一个无止境的过程：“我刚才把钢镚儿藏在右手里，那么现
在猜的人会认为它在我的左手，因此，我要把它移到右手。
But she also knows that I know she knows that, so I'll keep it in my
left."
但她也知道我知道她会怎么想，于是，我还是把它留在左手里。”
----------------------------------------------------------
Since the guesser goes through a similar process, the players form a
system of mutual second-guessing.
由于猜的人的思考过程也是如此，双方就构成了一个相互预测对方意图的游戏。
The riddle "What hand is the penny in?" is related to the riddle,
"What color is the chameleon on a mirror?" The bottomless complexity
which grows out of such simple rules intrigued John von Neumann, the
mathematician who developed programmable logic for a computer in the
early 1940s, and along with Wiener and Bateson launched the field of
cybernetics.
“哪只手里有钢镚儿”的谜题和“镜子上的变色龙是什么颜色”的谜题相关联。从这
类简单的规则衍生出的无限复杂性令约翰•冯•诺依曼（1）非常感兴趣。在二十世
纪四十年代早期，这位数学家就研发出用于计算机的可编程逻辑，并同维纳和贝
特森一起开辟了控制论的新领域。
----------------------------------------------------------
Von Neumann invented a mathematical theory of games.
冯•诺依曼发明了与游戏有关的数学理论。
He defined a game as a conflict of interests resolved by the
accumulative choices players make while trying to anticipate each
other.
他将游戏定义为一场利益冲突，游戏各方都试图预测其他方的举动，并采取一系
列的步骤，以解决冲突。
He called his 1944 book (coauthored by economist Oskar Morgenstern)
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior because he perceived that
economies possessed a highly coevolutionary and gamelike character,
which he hoped to illuminate with simple game dynamics.
1944年，他与经济学家奥斯卡•摩根斯特恩（2）合写了一本书——《博弈论与经济
行为》［2］。 他察觉到，经济具有高度共同进化和类似游戏的特性，而他希望
以简单的游戏动力学来阐释它。
The price of eggs, say, is determined by mutual second-guessing
between seller and buyer-how much will he accept, how much does he
think I will offer, how much less than what I am willing to pay should
I offer? The aspect von Neumann found amazing was that this infinite
regress of mutual bluffing, codeception, imitation, reflection, and
"game playing" would commonly settle down to a definite price, rather
than spiral on forever.
举例说，鸡蛋的价格取决于卖方和买方彼此之间的预期猜测——我出价多少他才能
够接受，他认为我会出多少，我的出价应该比我能承受的价位低多少？令冯•诺依
曼惊讶的是，这种相互欺诈、相互蒙骗、效仿、映像以及“博弈”的无休止递归一
般都能够落实到一个明确的价格上，而不是无限纠缠下去。
Even in a stock market made of thousands of mutual second-guessing
agents, the group of conflicting interests would quickly settle on a
price that was fairly stable.
即使在股市上，当有成千上万的代理在玩着相互预测的游戏时，利益冲突的各方
也能迅速达成一个还算稳定的价格。
----------------------------------------------------------
Von Neumann was particularly interested in seeing if he could develop
optimal strategies for these kinds of mutual games, because at first
glance they seemed almost insolvable in theory.
冯•诺依曼最感兴趣的是想看看自己能否给这种互动游戏找出最理想的策略，因为
乍一看来，它们在理论上几乎是无解的。
As an answer he came up with a theory of games.
于是他提出了博弈论作为解答。
Researchers at the U.S. government-funded RAND corporation, a think
tank based in Santa Monica, California, extended von Neumann's initial
work and eventually catalogued four basic varieties of mutual
second-guessing games.
位于加利福尼亚州圣塔莫妮卡市（Santa Monica）的兰德公司是美国政府资助的
智库。那里的研究人员发展了冯•诺依曼的工作，最后列出了四种有关相互猜测游
戏的基本变体。
Each variety had a different structure of rewards for winning, losing,
or drawing.
每一个变体各有不同的输赢或平局的奖励结构。
The four simple games were called "social dilemmas" in the technical
literature, but could be thought of as the four building blocks of
complicated coevolutionary games.
这四个简单的游戏在技术文献中统称为“社会困境”（social dilemmas）， 但又
可以被看作是构造复杂共同进化游戏的四块积木。
They were: Chicken, Stag Hunt, Deadlock, and the Prisoner's Dilemma
这四个基本变体是：草鸡博弈、猎鹿博弈、僵局，以及囚徒困境。
----------------------------------------------------------
Chicken is the game played by teenage daredevils.
“草鸡博弈”是供鲁莽的青少年玩的游戏。
Two cars race toward a cliff's edge; the driver who jumps out last,
wins.
两辆赛车朝悬崖边奔去；后摔出来的司机是赢家。
Stag Hunt is the dilemma faced by a bunch of hunters who must
cooperate to kill a stag, but may do better sneaking off by themselves
to hunt a rabbit if no one cooperates.
“猎鹿”是一群猎手面对的难题，他们必须合作才能把鹿杀死， 如果没有人合作的
话，那么开小差各自去撵兔子会更好些。
Do they gamble on cooperation (high payoff) or defection (low, but
sure payoff)?
他们是在赌合作（高回报）还是背叛（低，但是肯定有回报）吗？
Deadlock is a boring game where mutual defection pays best.
“僵局”是挺无聊的游戏，彼此背叛收益最高。
The last one, the Prisoner's Dilemma, is the most illuminating, and
became the guinea pig model for over 200 published social psychology
experiments in the late 1960s.
最后一个“囚徒困境”最有启发性，在1960年代末成为两百多例社会心理学实验的
测试模型。
----------------------------------------------------------
The Prisoner's Dilemma, invented in 1950 by Merrill Flood at RAND, is
a game for two separately held prisoners who must independently decide
whether to deny or confess to a crime.
“囚徒困境”是由兰德公司的梅里尔•弗拉德（3）于1950年设计出来的。游戏中，
两个分别关押的囚犯必须独立决定否认还是坦白罪行。
If both confess, each will be fined. If neither confesses, both go
free.
如果两人都认罪，那么两人都会受到惩罚。如果两人都否认的话，则都会被无罪
释放。
But if only one should confess, he is rewarded while the other is
fined.
但假如只有一人认罪，那么他就会得到奖励，而另一个则受到惩罚［3］。
Cooperation pays, but so does betrayal, if played right. What would
you do?
合作有回报，但如果策略奏效的话，背叛也有回报。你该怎么办呢？
----------------------------------------------------------
Played only once, betrayal of the other is the soundest choice.
如果只玩一次，背叛对手是最合理的选择。
But when two "prisoners" played the game over and over, learning from
each other-a game known as the Iterated Prisoner Dilemma-the dynamics
of the game shifted.
但当两个“囚徒”一次又一次地玩，从中相互学习——也即“重复的［4］囚徒困境”——游
戏的推演就发生了变化。
The other player could not be dismissed; he demanded to be attended
to, either as obligate enemy or obligate colleague.
你不能无视对手玩家的存在；不论是作为强制的敌手还是同伙，他都必须受到重
视［5］。
This tight mutual destiny closely paralleled the coevolutionary
relationship of political enemies, business competitors, or biological
symbionts.
这种紧密相连的共同命运与政敌之间、生意对手之间或者生态共生体之间的共同
进化关系非常类似。
As study of this simple game progressed, the larger question became,
What were the strategies of play for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
that resulted in the highest scores over the long term?
随着对这个简单游戏的研究的进一步深入，问题变成了：要想在长期内取得高
分，面对“重复的囚徒困境”应该采取什么样的策略？
And what strategies succeeded when played against many varieties of
players, from the ruthless to the kind?
还有，同无情或友善的各类玩家对垒时，该采取什么样的策略更容易取得成功呢？
----------------------------------------------------------
In 1980, Robert Axelrod, a political science professor at University
of Michigan, ran a tournament pitting 14 submitted strategies of
Prisoner's Dilemma against each other in a round robin to see which
one would triumph.
1980年，密歇根大学政治学教授罗伯特•阿克塞尔罗德（4）组织了一次锦标赛，
征集了14条不同的用于“囚徒困境”的对策，以循环赛的形式看哪个对策最后胜出。
The winner was a very simple strategy crafted by psychologist Anatol
Rapoport called Tit-For-Tat.
最后获胜的是一个最简单的对策，叫做“一报还一报”（Tit-For-Tat），由心理学
家阿纳托•拉帕波特（Anatol Rapoport）（5）设计。
The Tit-For-Tat strategy prescribed reciprocating cooperation for
cooperation, and defection for defection, and tended to engender
periods of cooperation.
“一报还一报”是往复型策略，它以合作回报合作，以背叛回报背叛，往往产生一
轮轮合作的周期。
Axelrod had discovered that "the shadow of the future," cast by
playing a game repeatedly rather than once, encouraged cooperation,
because it made sense for a player to cooperate now in order to ensure
cooperation from others later.
阿克塞尔罗德发现，重复游戏能产生一次性游戏所不具备的“未来阴影”之效果，
这种效果鼓励合作，因为对玩家来说，用现在对他人予以的合作来换取今后他人
给予的合作是一个合理的选择。
This glimpse of cooperation set Axelrod on this quest: "Under what
conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without
central authority?"
合作的闪现使阿克塞尔罗德陷入沉思：“没有中央集权的自我主义世界需要具备什
么条件才能浮现出合作的行为？”
----------------------------------------------------------
For centuries, the orthodox political reasoning originally articulated
by Thomas Hobbes in 1651 was dogma: that cooperation could only
develop with the help of a benign central authority.
1651年，托马斯•霍布斯（Thomas Hobbes） 宣称：只有在善意的中央集权帮助下
才能产生合作。这一传统政治推论曾经在几个世纪里一直被奉为圭臬。
Without top-down government, Hobbes claimed, there would be only
collective selfishness.
霍布斯断言，没有自上而下的管理，就只会有群体自私。
A strong hand had to bring forth political altruism, whatever the tone
of economics.
不管经济体制如何，必须有强大的势力来推行政治利他主义。
But the democracies of the West, beginning with the American and
French Revolutions, suggested that societies with good communications
could develop cooperative structures without heavy central control.
然而，在美国独立和法国革命后逐步建立起来的西方民主制度表明，民意通达的
社会可以在没有中央集权强力干预的情况下发展合作机制。
Cooperation can emerge out of self-interest. In our postindustrial
economy, spontaneous cooperation is a regular occurrence.
个人利益也能孕育出合作。在后工业化经济里，自发合作是常有的事情。
Widespread industry-initiated standards (both of quality and protocols
such as 110 volts or ASCII) and the rise of the Internet, the largest
working anarchy in the world, have only intensified interest in the
conditions necessary for hatching coevolutionary cooperation.
被广泛采用的工业标准（既有质量方面的，也有协议方面的，如 110伏电压，还
有ASCII码［6］），以及因特网这个世界上最大的无政府形态的兴起，都使得人
们更加关注孕育共同进化合作所需的必要条件。
----------------------------------------------------------
This cooperation is not a new age spiritualism.
这种合作不是新时代的精神至上主义。
Rather it is what Axelrod calls "cooperation without friendship or
foresight"-cold principles of nature that work at many levels to birth
a self-organizing structure.
相反，如阿克塞尔罗德所说，这是一种“不讲交情、无需远见的合作”——是大自然
的冷规则，适用于许多层面，并催生了自组织结构。
Sort of cooperation whether you want it or not.
不管你愿不愿意，多少都得合作。
----------------------------------------------------------
Games such as Prisoner's Dilemma can be played by any kind of adaptive
agent-not just humans.
“囚徒困境”这类游戏，不单只人类，任何自适应个体都可以玩。
Bacteria, armadillos, or computer transistors can make choices
according to various reward schemes, weighing immediate sure gain over
future greater but riskier gain.
细菌，犰狳，或是计算机里的半导体器件，都可以根据各种回报机制，在眼前的
稳妥收获与未来的高风险高回报之间做出权衡。
Played over time with the same partners, the results are both a game
and a type of coevolution.
当长时间与相同的伙伴一起玩这个游戏时，双方既是在博弈，又是在进行某种类
型的共同进化。
----------------------------------------------------------
Every complex adaptive organization faces a fundamental tradeoff.
每一个复杂的自适应组织都面临着基本的权衡。
A creature must balance perfecting a skill or trait (building up legs
to run faster) against experimenting with new traits (wings).
生物必须在完善现有技能、特质（练腿力以便跑得更快）与尝试新特质（翅膀）
之间作取舍。
It can never do all things at once. This daily dilemma is labeled the
tradeoff between exploration and exploitation.
它不可能同时做所有的事情。这种每天都会碰到的难题便属于在开发和利用之间
作权衡。
Axelrod makes an analogy with a hospital: "On average you can expect a
new medical drug to have a lower payoff than exploiting an established
medication to its limits.
阿克塞尔罗德用医院作了一个类比：“一般情况下你可以想见试用某种新药比尽可
能发掘已有成药的疗效回报来得低。
But if you gave every patient the current best drug, you'd never get
proven new drugs.
但假如你给所有病人用的都是目前最好的成药，你就永远无法验证新药的疗效。
From an individual's point of view you should never do the
exploration.
从病人个人角度来讲最好不要试用新药。
But from the society of individuals' point of view, you ought to try
some experiments." How much to explore (gain for the future) versus
how much to exploit (sure bet now) is the game a hospital has to play.
但从社会集合体的角度出发，做实验是必要的。”开发（未来收益）与利用（目前
稳赢的筹码）之比应该是多少，这是医院不得不作的博弈。
Living organisms have a similar tradeoff in deciding how much mutation
and innovation is needed to keep up with a changing environment.
生命有机体为了跟上环境的变化，在决定应该在多大程度上进行变异和创新时，
也会作出类似的权衡。
When they play the tradeoff against a sea of other creatures making
similar tradeoffs, it becomes a coevolutionary game.
当海量的生物都在做着类似的权衡并且互相影响时，就形成一个共同进化的博弈
游戏。
----------------------------------------------------------
Axelrod's 14-player Prisoner's Dilemma round robin tournament was
played on a computer.
阿克塞尔罗德发起的、有14位玩家参与的“囚徒困境”循环锦标赛是在电脑上进行
的。
In 1987, Axelrod extended the computerization of the game by setting
up a system in which small populations of programs played randomly
generated Prisoner's Dilemma strategies.
1987年，阿克塞尔罗德通过设定一套系统拓展了这个电脑游戏。 在系统里，有一
小群程序玩家执行随机产生的“囚徒困境”策略。
Each random strategy would be scored after a round of playing against
all the other strategies running; the ones with the highest scores got
copied the most to the next generation, so that the most successful
strategies propagated.
每个随机策略在和所有其它运行中的策略对阵一圈之后被打分，得分最高的策略
在下一代的复制率最高，于是最成功的策略便得以繁衍和传播。
Because many strategies could succeed only by "preying" on other
strategies, they would thrive only as long as their prey survived.
许多策略都是通过“捕食”其他策略来取胜的，因而，只有当猎物能存活时，这些
策略才能兴旺发达。
This leads to the oscillating dynamics found everywhere in the wilds
of nature; how fox and hare populations rise and fall over the years
in coevolutionary circularity.
这就导出了自然界荒野中俯拾皆是的生物数量呈周期性波动的机理，说明了狐狸
和兔子的数量在年复一年的共同进化的循环中是如何起起落落的。
When the hares increase the foxes boom; when the foxes boom, the hares
die off.
兔子数量增，狐狸繁殖多；狐狸繁殖多，兔子死翘翘。
But when there are no hares, the foxes starve. When there are less
foxes, the hares increase.
但是没有了兔子，狐狸就得饿死。狐狸数量少了，兔子数量就多了。
And when the hares increase the foxes do too, and so on.
兔子多了，狐狸也就多了，以此类推。
----------------------------------------------------------
In 1990, Kristian Lindgren, working at the Neils Bohr Institute in
Copenhagen, expanded these coevolutionary experiments by increasing
the population of players to 1,000, introducing random noise into the
games, and letting this artificial coevolution run for up to 30,000
generations.
1990年，在哥本哈根尼尔斯波尔研究院工作的克里斯蒂安•林德格雷（7）将这个
共同进化实验的玩家数扩展到一千，同时引入随机干扰，并使这个人工共同进化
过程可以繁衍到三万世代之后。
Lindgren found that masses of dumb agents playing Prisoner's Dilemma
not only reenacted the ecological oscillations of fox and hare, but
the populations also created many other natural phenomenon such as
parasitism, spontaneously emerging symbiosis, and long-term stable
coexistence between species, as if they were an ecology.
林德格雷发现，由众多参与“囚徒困境”游戏的愚钝个体所组成的群体不但重现了
狐狸和兔子数量的生态波动，也产生出许多其他自然现象，如寄生、自发涌现的
共生共栖，以及物种间长期稳定的共存关系等，就如同一整套生态系统。
Lindgren's work excited some biologists because his very long runs
displayed long periods when the mix of different "species" of strategy
was very stable.
林德格雷的工作让一些生物学家兴奋不已，因为在他的漫长回合博弈游戏中出现
了一个又一个的周期。每个周期的持续时间都很长；而在一个周期内，由不同策
略的“物种”所形成的混合维持着非常稳定的状态。
These historical epochs were interrupted by very sudden, short-lived
episodes of instability, when old species went extinct and new ones
took root.
然 而，这些盛世都被一些突发、短命的不稳定插曲所打断，于是旧的物种灭绝，
新的物种生根。
Quickly a new stable arrangement of new species of strategies arose
and persisted for many thousands of generations.
持新策略的物种间迅速达成新的稳定，又持续发展数千代。
This motif matches the general pattern of evolution found in earthly
fossils, a pattern known in the evolutionary trade as punctuated
equilibrium, or "punk eek" for short.
这个模式与从早期化石里发现的进化的常见模式相契合，该模式在进化论业界里
叫做间断平衡（punctuated equilibrium）［7］，或简称为“蹦移（punk
eek）”。
----------------------------------------------------------
One marvelous result from these experiments bears consideration by
anyone hoping to manage coevolutionary forces.
这些实验得出了一个了不起的结果，令所有希望驾驭共同进化力量的人都为之瞩
目。
It's another law of the gods. It turns out that no matter what clever
strategy you engineer or evolve in a world laced by
chameleon-on-a-mirror loops, if it is applied as a perfectly pure rule
that you obey absolutely, it will not be evolutionary resilient to
competing strategies.
这是众神的另一条律法：在一个饰以“镜子上的变色龙”式的叠套花环的世界里，
无论你设计或演变出怎样高妙的策略，如果你绝对服从它，为它所用，从进化的
角度来看，这个策略就无法与其他具竞争力的策略相抗衡。
That is, a competing strategy will figure out how to exploit your rule
in the long run.
也即是说，如何在持久战中让规则为你所用才是一个具竞争力的策略。
A little touch of randomness (mistakes, imperfections), on the other
hand, actually creates long-term stability in coevolutionary worlds by
allowing some strategies to prevail for relative eons by not being so
easily aped.
另一方面，引入少许的随机因素（如差错、缺陷）反而能够在共同进化的世界里
缔造出长久的稳定，因为这样一来某些策略无法被轻易地“山寨”，从而能够在相
对长的时期里占据统治地位。
Without noise-wholly unexpected and out-of-character choices-the
opportunity for escalating evolution is lost because there are not
enough periods of stability to keep the system going.
没有了干扰——即出乎意料或是反常的选择——就没有足够多的稳定周期来维持系统
的发展，逐步升级的进化也就失去了机会。
Error keeps the glue of coevolutionary relationships from binding too
tightly into runaway death spirals, and therefore error keeps a
coevolutionary system afloat and moving forward. Honor thy error.
错误能使共同进化关系不致因为胶着太紧而陷入自沉的漩涡，从而保持共同进化
的系统顺流前行。向你的错误致敬吧。
----------------------------------------------------------
Playing coevolutionary games in computers has provided other lessons.
在电脑中进行的这些共同进化游戏还提供了另外的教益。
One of the few notions from game theory to penetrate the popular
culture was the distinction of zero-sum and nonzero-sum games.
零和与非零和游戏的区别是少数几个渗透到大众文化中的博弈论理念之一。
Chess, elections, races, and poker are zero-sum games: the winner's
earnings are deducted from the loser's assets.
象棋、选举、赛跑和扑克是零和游戏：赢家的收益取自输家的损失。
Natural wilderness, the economy, a mind, and networks on the other
hand, are nonzero-sum games. Wolverines don't have to lose just
because bears live.
自然界的荒野、经济、思维意识、网络则属于非零和游戏：熊的存在并不意味狼
獾会失败。
The highly connected loops of coevolutionary conflict mean the whole
can reward (or at times cripple) all members.
共同进化中的冲突环环相扣、 彼此关联，意味着整体收益可以惠及（有时殃及）
所有成员。
Axelrod told me, "One of the earliest and most important insights from
game theory was that nonzero-sum games had very different strategic
implications than zero-sum games.
阿克塞尔罗德告诉我， “来自博弈论最早也是最重要的洞见之一就是，非零和游
戏的战略内涵与零和游戏的战略内涵截然不同。
In zero-sum games whatever hurts the other guy is good for you. In
nonzero-sum games you can both do well, or both do poorly.
零和游戏中对他人的任何伤害都对你有好处。在非零和游戏 中，你们可能共荣，
也可能同衰。
I think people often take a zero-sum view of the world when they
shouldn't.
我认为，人们常用零和游戏的观点看世界，其实他们本不该这样。
They often say, 'Well I'm doing better than the other guy, therefore I
must be doing well.' In a nonzero-sum you could be doing better than
the other guy and both be doing terribly."
他们常说：“我比别人做得好，所以我就该发达。”而在非零和 游戏里，尽管你比
别人做得好，你也可能和他一样潦倒。”
----------------------------------------------------------
Axelrod noticed that the champion Tit-For-Tat strategy always won
without exploiting an opponent's strategy-it merely mirrored the
other's actions.
阿克塞尔罗德注意到，作为赢家，“一报还一报”策略从不琢磨利用对手的策略——
它只是以其人之道还治其人之身。
Tit-For-Tat could not beat anyone's strategy one on one, but in a
nonzero-sum game it would still win a tournament because it had the
highest cumulative score when played against many kinds of rules.
在一对一的对决中，该策略并不能胜过任何一个其他策略；但在非零和游戏中，
它却能够在跟许多策略对抗的过程中取得最高累积分，从而夺得锦标。
As Axelrod pointed out to William Poundstone, author of Prisoner's
Dilemma, "That's a very bizarre idea.
正如阿克塞尔罗德向“囚徒困境”的始作俑者威廉• 庞德斯通（8）指出的：“这个
理念太不可思议了。
You can't win a chess tournament by never beating anybody." But with
coevolution-change changing in response to itself-you can win without
beating others.
下棋时怎么可能不击败任何一个对手就夺得锦标呢？”但是在共同进化中——变化是
响应自身而变化——不用打击他人就能赢。
Hard-nosed CEOs in the business world now recognize that in the era of
networks and alliances, companies can make billions without beating
others. Win-win, the cliché is called.
企业界那些精明的首席执行官们现在也承认，在网络和结盟的时代，公司犯不着
打击他人就可以大把地赚钱。这个就是所谓的双赢。
----------------------------------------------------------
Win-win is the story of life in coevolution.
双赢是共同进化模式下生命所演绎的故事。
----------------------------------------------------------
Sitting in his book-lined office, Robert Axelrod mused on the
consequences of understanding coevolution and then added, "I hope my
work on the evolution of cooperation helps the world avoid conflict.
坐在堆满书籍的办公室里，罗伯特•阿克塞尔罗德还沉浸在对共同进化的理解和思
考中。
If you read the citation which the National Academy of Science gave
me," he said pointing to a plaque on the wall, "they think it helped
avoid nuclear war."
然后他补充道：“希望我在合作进化方面的工作有助于避免世界冲突。你看过国家
科学院给我的奖状没有，”他指着墙上的一块牌匾说，“他们认为它有助于避免核
战争。”
Although von Neumann was a key figure in the development of the atom
bomb, he did not formally apply his own theories to the gamelike
politics of the nuclear arms race.
尽管冯•诺依曼是发展原子弹的关键人物，但他并没有将他的理论明确地应用于核
军备竞赛的政治游戏。
But after von Neumann's death in 1957, strategists in military think
tanks began using his game theory to analyze the cold war, which had
taken on the flavor of a coevolutionary "obligate cooperation" between
two superpower enemies.
在 1957年冯•诺依曼逝世之后，军事战略智囊团开始利用他的博弈论分析冷战，
冷战中两个相互为敌的超级大国带有共同进化关系中“强制合作”的意味。
Gorbachev had a fundamental coevolutionary insight, says Axelrod. "He
saw that the Soviets could get more security with fewer tanks rather
than with more tanks.
戈尔巴乔夫具有基本的共同进化洞察力。阿尔塞德罗说，“他看到，减少而不是增
加坦克数量会让苏联更安全。
Gorbi unilaterally threw away 10,000 tanks, and that made it harder
for US and Europe to have a big military budget, which helped get this
whole process going that ended the cold war."
他单方面裁掉了一万辆坦克，使得美国和欧洲更难有借口保持大规模的军事预
算，借此全面展开了结束冷战的进程。”
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Perhaps the most useful lesson of coevolution for "wannabe" gods is
that in coevolutionary worlds control and secrecy are
counterproductive.
对于“伪神们”［8］来说，从共同进化中获得的最有用的教训就是，在共同进化的
世界里，控制和保密只能帮倒忙。
You can't control, and revelation works better than concealment.
你无法控制，而开诚布公比遮遮掩掩效果更好。
"In zero-sum games you always try to hide your strategy," says
Axelrod.
“在零和游戏中你总想隐藏自己的策略，”阿克塞尔罗德说。
"But in nonzero-sum games you might want to announce your strategy in
public so the other players need to adapt to it."
“但在非零和游戏中，你可能会将策略公之于众，这样一来，别的玩家就必须适应
它。”
Gorbachev's strategy was effective because he did it publicly;
unilaterally withdrawing in secret would have done nothing.
戈尔巴乔夫的策略之所以有效，是因为他公开实施了这个策略；如果只是秘密地
单方面削减武器则会一事无成。
----------------------------------------------------------
The chameleon on the mirror is a completely open system. Neither the
lizard nor the glass has any secrets.
镜子上的变色龙是一个完全开放的系统。无论是蜥蜴还是玻璃，都没有任何秘密。
The grand closure of Gaia keeps cycling because all its lesser cycles
inform each other in constant coevolutionary communication.
盖亚的大封闭圈里循环不断，是因为其中所有的小循环都在不断的共同进化沟通
中互相交流。
From the collapse of Soviet command-style economies, we know that open
information keeps an economy stable and growing.
从苏联指令式计划经济的崩溃中我们了解到，公开的信息能够保持经济的稳定和
增长。
----------------------------------------------------------
Coevolution can be seen as two parties snared in the web of mutual
propaganda.
共同进化可以看作是双方陷入相互传教的网络。
Coevolutionary relationships, from parasites to allies, are in their
essence informational.
共同进化的关系，从寄生到结盟，从本质上来讲都具有信息的属性。
A steady exchange of information welds them into a single system.
稳步的信息交流将它们焊接成一个单一的 系统。
At the same time, the exchange-whether of insults or assistance or
plain news-creates a commons from which cooperation,
self-organization, and win-win endgames can spawn.
与此同时，信息交流——无论是侮辱、还是帮助，抑或只是普通新闻——都为合作、
自组织，以及双赢结局的破土发芽开辟了园地。
----------------------------------------------------------
In the Network Era-that age we have just entered-dense communication
is creating artificial worlds ripe for emergent coevolution,
spontaneous self-organization, and win-win cooperation.
在我们刚刚迈入的网络时代中，频繁的交流正在创造日益成熟的人工世界，为共
同进化、自发的自组织以及双赢合作的涌现而准备着。
In this Era, openness wins, central control is lost, and stability is
a state of perpetual almost-falling ensured by constant error.
在这个时代，开放者赢，中央控制者输，而稳定，则是由持续的误差所保证的一
种永久临跌状态。
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