金融犯罪研究--中译英（本人作品）
自由贸易区洗钱与反洗钱：国际经验与上海对策
内容摘要：自由贸易区优惠措施与便利措施在便利交易的同时也给其带来了洗钱风险，加强自由贸易区反洗钱监管已经成为国际共识。国际上现有自由贸易区的“宽松管制”对洗钱分子和恐怖融资分子极具吸引力，其洗钱与恐怖融资的风险主要来源于以下几个方面：一是自由贸易区反洗钱与反恐怖融资措施的缺失或不到位所带来的洗钱风险；二是监管放松和低透明度所带来的洗钱风险；三是系统与部门协调难度大所带来的洗钱风险；四是高风险货品所带来的“天然”洗钱风险。贸易洗钱是不法分子清洗非法所得的最主要途径之一。本文的案例证实了与自由贸易区相联系的洗钱、恐怖融资风险及其薄弱环节。此外，自由贸易区还被用于洗钱上位犯罪活动（如走私、贩毒）及其非法所得的清洗。在自由贸易区反洗钱的国际经验方面，FATF提出了与自由贸易区洗钱问题有关的风险指标和反贸易洗钱的六项原则。加勒比反洗钱组织从多方面提出自由贸易区反洗钱监管的建议。从现实条件来看，当前上海自由贸易区反洗钱监管必须依据现有反洗钱法规，立足相关金融机构，发挥上海总部兼具反洗钱监测分析与监管职能的优势，构建中国（上海）自由贸易区反洗钱工作机制：一是发挥金融机构为自由贸易区反洗钱义务主体作用；二是探索建立以“合理怀疑”为基础的贸易洗钱可疑交易报告制度；三是有针对性地强化对自由贸易区金融机构的反洗钱监管；四是建立反洗钱主管部门与海关、税务、工商及贸易主管部门的协同机制；五是深化反贸易洗钱培训教育工作；六是加强对贸易洗钱类型和警示特征的研究，研发并利用互联网技术和工具；七是整合金融和贸易数据，建立以央行上海总部为二级主体（相对于总行监测中心而言）的反洗钱监测分析体系。
Money Laundering and Anti-Money Laundering in Free Trade Zones: International Experience & Shanghai Strategies
Abstract: Preferential and facilitative policies in the Free Trade Zones (FTZ) bring about not only conveniences for business transactions but also risks for money laundering (ML). The significance of strengthened anti-money laundering (AML) supervision has become internationally recognized. The existing FTZs across the world have proved to be extremely attractive to money launderers and terrorist financier with their loose regulations which can expose the FTZs to risks mainly including: 1) ML risk due to absence or inadequacy of Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Anti-Terrorist Financing (ATF) framework; 2) ML risk due to loose regulation and low transparency; 3) ML risk due to great difficulty in cross-system/department coordination; 4) “Natural” ML risk brought about by high risk goods. Trade-based money laundering (TBML) is one of the most used ML channels by money launderers. The cases in this paper have shown clearly the ML/TF risk and vulnerabilities of the FTZs. In addition, FTZs have been used in money laundering of illegal gains from the upstream crimes such as smuggling and drug trafficking. In terms of international AML experience, FATF (Financial Action Task Force) has proposed risk indicators concerning money laundering in FTZs as well as six AML principles; and CFATF (Caribbean Financial Action Task Force) has made AML suggestions for FTZs in various aspects. In the current context, AML supervision in Shanghai FTZ must be based on the existing AML laws & regulations and rely on the relevant financial institutions; and advantages of the Shanghai headquarters in AML monitoring, analysis and supervision must be made full use to construct an effective AML mechanism in China (Shanghai) FTZ. To this end, firstly, financial institutions should take the main responsibilities in AML actions in the FTZ; secondly, efforts should be made to develop a reporting system for suspicious transactions based on the principle of “reasonable doubt”; thirdly, targeted strengthening of AML supervision in the FTZ should be implemented accordingly; fourthly, a coordination mechanism should be built between AML competent authority and other departments in charge of customs, taxation, industry and trade; fifthly, AML training and education need to be strengthened; sixthly, more researches on TBML types and distinctive characteristics should be done and internet technology and instruments should be developed and applied; seventhly, financial and trade data should be integrated to build a secondary AML monitoring analysis system in PBC Shanghai Head Office (complementing the monitoring center in the PBC Beijing Head Office).
内容摘要：自由贸易区优惠措施与便利措施在便利交易的同时也给其带来了洗钱风险，加强自由贸易区反洗钱监管已经成为国际共识。国际上现有自由贸易区的“宽松管制”对洗钱分子和恐怖融资分子极具吸引力，其洗钱与恐怖融资的风险主要来源于以下几个方面：一是自由贸易区反洗钱与反恐怖融资措施的缺失或不到位所带来的洗钱风险；二是监管放松和低透明度所带来的洗钱风险；三是系统与部门协调难度大所带来的洗钱风险；四是高风险货品所带来的“天然”洗钱风险。贸易洗钱是不法分子清洗非法所得的最主要途径之一。本文的案例证实了与自由贸易区相联系的洗钱、恐怖融资风险及其薄弱环节。此外，自由贸易区还被用于洗钱上位犯罪活动（如走私、贩毒）及其非法所得的清洗。在自由贸易区反洗钱的国际经验方面，FATF提出了与自由贸易区洗钱问题有关的风险指标和反贸易洗钱的六项原则。加勒比反洗钱组织从多方面提出自由贸易区反洗钱监管的建议。从现实条件来看，当前上海自由贸易区反洗钱监管必须依据现有反洗钱法规，立足相关金融机构，发挥上海总部兼具反洗钱监测分析与监管职能的优势，构建中国（上海）自由贸易区反洗钱工作机制：一是发挥金融机构为自由贸易区反洗钱义务主体作用；二是探索建立以“合理怀疑”为基础的贸易洗钱可疑交易报告制度；三是有针对性地强化对自由贸易区金融机构的反洗钱监管；四是建立反洗钱主管部门与海关、税务、工商及贸易主管部门的协同机制；五是深化反贸易洗钱培训教育工作；六是加强对贸易洗钱类型和警示特征的研究，研发并利用互联网技术和工具；七是整合金融和贸易数据，建立以央行上海总部为二级主体（相对于总行监测中心而言）的反洗钱监测分析体系。
Money Laundering and Anti-Money Laundering in Free Trade Zones: International Experience & Shanghai Strategies
Abstract: Preferential and facilitative policies in the Free Trade Zones (FTZ) bring about not only conveniences for business transactions but also risks for money laundering (ML). The significance of strengthened anti-money laundering (AML) supervision has become internationally recognized. The existing FTZs across the world have proved to be extremely attractive to money launderers and terrorist financier with their loose regulations which can expose the FTZs to risks mainly including: 1) ML risk due to absence or inadequacy of Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Anti-Terrorist Financing (ATF) framework; 2) ML risk due to loose regulation and low transparency; 3) ML risk due to great difficulty in cross-system/department coordination; 4) “Natural” ML risk brought about by high risk goods. Trade-based money laundering (TBML) is one of the most used ML channels by money launderers. The cases in this paper have shown clearly the ML/TF risk and vulnerabilities of the FTZs. In addition, FTZs have been used in money laundering of illegal gains from the upstream crimes such as smuggling and drug trafficking. In terms of international AML experience, FATF (Financial Action Task Force) has proposed risk indicators concerning money laundering in FTZs as well as six AML principles; and CFATF (Caribbean Financial Action Task Force) has made AML suggestions for FTZs in various aspects. In the current context, AML supervision in Shanghai FTZ must be based on the existing AML laws & regulations and rely on the relevant financial institutions; and advantages of the Shanghai headquarters in AML monitoring, analysis and supervision must be made full use to construct an effective AML mechanism in China (Shanghai) FTZ. To this end, firstly, financial institutions should take the main responsibilities in AML actions in the FTZ; secondly, efforts should be made to develop a reporting system for suspicious transactions based on the principle of “reasonable doubt”; thirdly, targeted strengthening of AML supervision in the FTZ should be implemented accordingly; fourthly, a coordination mechanism should be built between AML competent authority and other departments in charge of customs, taxation, industry and trade; fifthly, AML training and education need to be strengthened; sixthly, more researches on TBML types and distinctive characteristics should be done and internet technology and instruments should be developed and applied; seventhly, financial and trade data should be integrated to build a secondary AML monitoring analysis system in PBC Shanghai Head Office (complementing the monitoring center in the PBC Beijing Head Office).
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