分析家的解释

文本来自小组昨晚对 Bruce Fink所著Fundamentals of Psychoanalytic Technique的翻译

（大标题自拟，小标题来自原书章节）

Interpretation Does Not Provide a Metalanguage

解释并不提供一种元语言

P.88

Interpretation ... points to desire, to which it is, in a certain sense, identical. Desire is, in sum, interpretation itself. -Lacan (1978, p. 176) 解释....指向的是欲望，在某种意义上说，解释就等同于欲望。简而言之，欲望就是解释本身。 ——拉康

（在拉康的语境中，症状是隐喻，而欲望是换喻。一个人之所以表现出某种症状，恰恰是因为某种意义的固着。而分析家给出的解释interpretation也应该是换喻，能够不断让症状的意义滑动起来，而不是妄图以自己的意义替代症状的意义）

If there is a cardinal law of psychoanalysis, it is to avoid talking nonsense, even in the name of analytic categories. No wild analysis: don't throw out words that have meaning only to the analyst. -Lacan (1976, p. 34)

如果精神分析存在某种首要的法则的话，那么这个法则就是说要避免说一些废话，即便是打着分析的旗号。所以，不要去野蛮分析，不要抛出只对分析家才有意义的话语。——拉康

（重要的不是精神分析怎么说，不是你的咨询师怎么说，不是你的父母、朋友怎么说，重要的是你怎么说）

For many decades, psychoanalytic theory served as the basis of a great many interpretations made by analysts; the Oedipus complex was the great template, the overriding grid through which the analysand's experience was seen.

多年以来，精神分析理论充当着分析家所做出的大量的解释的基础，俄狄浦斯情结就是一个绝佳的例子， 或者说俄狄浦斯情结就像一个重要的坐标系，通过这样一个坐标系，分析者的经验可以被理解。

The language of analytic theory was considered to be the perfect language within which to express the analysand's experience-in that sense it could be thought of as a metalanguage with respect to the language spontaneously employed by the analysand-and it was sometimes even thought that it sufficed to reduce his experience to analytic theory for the analysts work to be done, so to speak.

精神分析理论被认为是表达分析者经验的完美语言。在某种意义上说，相对于由分析者所自发使用的语言来说，精神分析理论的语言可以被认为是一种元语言。有时，人们甚至认为，把分析者的经验还原成分析的理论，分析家的工作就完成了。

Once the analysand's life had been formulated in the language of the theory, it was believed that his symptoms should disappear.

一旦分析者的生活用理论语言进行描述，我们就认为他的症状就应该消失了。

（然而情况并非如此）

By the 1920s, Freud had already noticed that interpretations based on theoretical constructs like the Oedipus complex were no longer effective: Patients coming to see analysts had already read several analytic texts, had already framed their own experience using psychoanalytic concepts before ever lying on the couch, and would proffer statements like, "My problem, Doc, is that I'm still in love with my mother and that's why I hate my father."

到了20世纪20年代， 弗洛伊德就已经注意到，基于理论建构的解释，比如像俄狄浦斯情结，已经不再有效了。病人来见分析家之前，就早已熟读很多精神分析的文本了，而且在上躺椅之前，就已经使用了很多精神分析的概念来框自己的经验。 他会说：医生我的问题就在于，我仍旧爱着我的母亲，而这就是我恨父亲的原因。

Oedipal formulations had become so commonplace as to no longer have any effect when used as the basis for interpretations.

俄狄浦斯的表述已经变成了老生常谈，以至于当它被用作解释的基础的时候，已经不再具有任何的效果了。

As additions were made to the theory-whether they were later Freudian concepts such as the id and the superego, Abraham's partial object, or Klein's good and bad objects-analysts often tried to translate their analysands' experience into those; such translations may have had some impact at the outset, but their effect soon wore off as later psychoanalytic concepts were again assimilated by the public .26

随着理论的增补——无论它们是弗洛伊德后来提出的概念，如它我id和超我superego，还有亚伯拉罕的部分客体，克莱因的好客体坏客体——分析家们经常试图把分析者的经验转化为这些理论；这种理论化的转化可能在一开始可能会产生一些效果，但是随着后来的精神分析概念再次被公众吸收，这些转换它们的效果很快就会消失。26

26 In this respect, it might be thought that analysis was a victim of its own success, This assumes, however, that translation into theoretical terms is a valid form of interpretation in the first place 在这个意义上，我们可以认为，分析是其自身成功的受害者。 然而，这就假定了，把它转化成理论术语在一开始是一种有效地解释的形式。

（某种意义上说，一个理论在民间越广为接受，那它在临床上就越发失败。因为恰恰是理论本身同化了病人的感受，成为病人症状的掩护）

Rightly enough, analysts like Casement (1991) objected to this form of interpretation because it overlooks the particularity of each analysand and tends to look at patients ,only from the perspective of what they all have in common: supposedly universal conflicts like the Oedipal complex, or supposedly universal developmental phases like the depressive position, As Casement (pp, 206-209) indicated, we cannot immediately assume that silence on the analysand's part signifies resistance just because analytic theory suggests that it might on certain .occasions; in many, if not most cases, its meaning is far more complex than that.

有些分析家，像凯斯门特，就反对这样的解释，因为它忽视了每一个分析者的独特性，而只是从这些病人共性的视角来着眼这些病人：比如假定了普遍冲突，像俄狄浦斯情结；或假定了普遍的发展阶段，比如克莱因的抑郁心位。正如凯斯门特所指出，我们并不会直接地假定分析者只要一沉默就意味着阻抗，仅仅是因为精神分析的理论说，在有的情况下，它可能是阻抗。而在很多情况下（如果不是在大多数情况下），沉默的意义要远比阻抗来得复杂地多。

But we must take our critique of the notion of interpretation as a kind of perfect metalanguage further still (Soler, 1996), Translating the analysand's experience from one idiom to another-from his quotidian language to psychoanalytic jargon--cannot change his experience; it simply puts a theoretical meaning on it, He may well be satisfied with that meaning, for he feels that by providing it, the analyst is initiating him into psychoanalytic theory and taking him to be a serious candidate for analytic training or a serious analyst in-training, His satisfaction with it, however, is likely to serve as an obstacle to him going further, and he is likely to feel that a theoretical formulation is the last word: It provides a final explanation with which he should be content.

但是，我们必须把我们对于“解释”的批评看作是一种更加完美的元语言。(索莱尔，1996 )，把分析者的经验从一种话语翻译成另一种话语——从他的日常语言翻译成精神分析术语——并不能改变他的经验；这只是给它一个理论上的意义， 分析者很可能会很满足于这个意义，因为分析者觉得分析家通过提供这个意义，是把分析者纳入到了精神分析理论当中， 并且把分析者要么是当作是精神分析性训练的候选人，要么是把他当成是了处在训练的分析家。然而，分析者对此的满足却很可能会阻碍他的分析进行下去。分析者很有可能感觉到一种理论化的表述变成了一个定论：它为分析者提供了一个欣然接受的最终的解释。

（给分析者一个解释，一个理论的命名，一个建议，到头来也只是一个暗示，暗示分析者可以获得某种收益，这只能是扮演着一个话题的终结者，一个感受的异化）

This can lead to a short-ciruiting of the psychoanalytic process, which,in its fullest expression, involves facing the fact that there are no such fnal explanations or ultimate answers。

这可能导致精神分析过程的短路，对此最充分的表达是，涉及面对这样一个事实：即没有这样一种最终解释或终极答案。

Although the analysand repeatedly wonders about the why and wherefore of his direction in life-about why he sided with one parent against the other, why he believed his parents wanted that certain something above all else frm him, why he accepted to be humiliated by someone, why he complied with someone's ever wish, why he did things that in retrospect were ver harmful to himself and seem to have blocked his progrss in life-and although he comes up with myriad reasons that explain in part what seem to have been choices that he made at different crcial moments or turning points, something always remains unexplained and, indeed,unexplainable.

尽管分析者可能会不断地想要搞清楚，为何生活方向是这样的——比如，为什么他和自己父母的某一方一起去反对另一方，为什么他觉得父母特别想要从他的身上得到某种东西，为什么他会接受被别人羞辱，为什么他会接受别人所有的愿望，为什么他做了一些事情回想起来时都是对他自己有伤害性的，而且这些事情看似也阻碍了他在生活上的进展，分析者可能会反复地询问这样的问题，尽管分析者可能会想出无数的理由部分地解释说，他在不同时期关键转折点上为什么做出了这样的选择，但是总是有一些东西是无法解释的，实际上这个无法解释的东西也是不可解释的。

The furtherback in time his explorations go, the less discernible his motives seem to become.

分析者越是探索他自己的过去，他的动机就会变得越是难以识别。

Rather than try to fill in these holes in his explanations or gloss over these enigmatic decisions with theoretical accounts or normalizing comments ("everyone has to do something like that to separate from his parents and individuate"; see Chapter 9), the analyst must aim to bring this lack of explanations to the fore27

相比于试图用他的解释来填补这些空洞，并且用一些理论的说法来掩盖这些（分析者做出的）神秘莫测的决定，或者一些正常化的评论（每一个人都得做一些事情，比如和自己的父母分离和个体化）分析家要干的是必须把这些没有办法解释的东西浮现出来.27