新美学 • 每日翻译 | 非-摄影的概念 | 第一章（二）
The Concept of Non-Photography | Chapter 1 What is Seen In a Photo？|The Photographic Stance and Vision-force; Universal Photographic Fiction|Larualle
非-摄影的概念|第一章 在一张照片中被看到的是什么？|摄影姿态和视觉力；普遍的摄影虚构主义|拉怀勒
（注：以上依次为内容标题 | 章节标题 | 书名 | 作者）
翻译者：Li Yi
The Photographic Stance and Vision-Force
摄影姿态和视觉力
Let us try first of all to describe systematically the photographic act - this description will be nuanced and rectified as we proceed - according to the new paradigm, 'abstract' or 'scientific' in spirit, that we have evoked above and which we shall go on to define more precisely.
让我们先试着来系统地描述摄影行为——这一描述在我们开始时会有细微的差异和改动——根据我们在前文中提及的新的范式，即“抽象”或“科学”精神，我们将更精确地对此进行定义。
We cannot be certain that photography is a position or the taking up of a position before the World, a decision of position towards the object or the motif. Before the eye, the hand, the torso are implicated in it, perhaps it is from the most obscure and the most irreflexive depth of the body that the photogTaphic act departs. Not from the organ-body or body as organ-support, from the substancebody, but from a body absolutely without organs, from a stance rather than a position. The photographer does not throw himself into the World, he replaces himself firstly in his body as in a stance, and renounces all corporeal or psychic intentionality. 'Stance' - this word means: to be rooted in oneself, to be held within one's own immanence, to be at one's station rather than in a position relative to the 'motif'. If there is a photographic thinking, it is first and foremost of the order of a test of one's naive self rather than of the decision, of auto-impression rather than of expression, of the self-inherence of the body rather than of being-in-the-World- A thinking that is rooted in rather than upon a corporeal base. What is the body as photographic base, stripped of intentionality? It is that which concentrates i.n itself an undivided and precisely non-intentional vision-force. What body for photography? Precisely not the phenomenological body as part of the World or as thrown-into-the-World, but an originary and transcendental arche-body that is from the outset 'vision' through and through; but an as-yet un-objectivating vision. Photographic thought, rather than being primarily relational, differential, positional, is first of all real, in that sort of undivided experience, lived as non-positional self-vision-force, which has no need to posit itself simultaneously on the object, to divide with itself, to identify itself with the World and to reflect itself in itself. The ultimate photographic lived experience – that of the immediate self- and vision-application, the very passion or affect of vision - is too naive to be anything other than an indivisible flux of vision, of which it is not even certain whether it will be divided by the camera. This vision-force resists the World through its very passivity and its impotence to separate from itself and to objectivare itself. The existence of the photographer does not precede his essence; it is his body as force, indivisible into organs, that precedes the World.
我们无法确定摄影是一个站位或在世界前占据一个位置，一个面向对象或主题的对位置的决定。或许在眼睛，手和躯干涉入之前，摄影行为就从身体中最昏暗、最深不见光的深处出发了。并非从器官-身体或作为器官支架的身体，从质料-身体出发，而是从一个完全无器官的身体，一种姿态而非位置出发。摄影师并非将自己抛入世界，他先是把自己从身体里置换到一种姿态中，然后抛弃一切肉体和精神的意向性。“姿态”——这个词意谓着：在自身之中扎根，在自身的内在中持存，成为自身的位置而非与“主题”相关的位置。如果有一种摄影式思考，那么它首先依照对一个人的本真自我而非决定，对自动-印迹而非表达，对身体的自有天赋而非世界之中的此在的测试的规则。一种植根在肉体基础之中而非之上的思考。什么是被剥去意向性的作为摄影基础的身体？那是在自身中聚焦的一种未曾分裂且恰好是非刻意的视觉力。摄影用什么身体？恰恰不是作为世界的一部分或作为被抛-入-世界的现象学的身体，而是完全来自于开端“视觉”的源始的、超验的元-身体；是一种至今仍非-客观化的视觉。摄影式思考，并非先要是相关的，不同的，位置的，而是首先要真实，在那种未分裂的经验中，作为非-位置的自我视觉力活跃着，无需将自身同时置放到对象之上来分割自身，将自身与世界相统一并在自身之中倒映自身。终极的摄影式生活经验——关于直接的自我-和视觉-应用，视觉所独有的激情或感染力——太过本真而无法成为除一种视觉的整体流动之外的任何东西，甚至并不确定它是否会被摄像机所分割。这种视觉力通过它独有的被动性以及对分离自身和对象化自身的无效性来抵抗世界。摄影师的存在并不优先于他的本质；是他看不见器官的身体作为力而优先于世界。
There is therefore - and this is exactly the same thing- a veritable photogTaphic transcendental reduction of the World, in the sense that the logic which makes for the coherence of the latter, which assures it and permanently renews its transcendence and the inexhaustibility of its horizons, that this logic, which also governs everyday life in the World and its 'originary faith', is as if globally inhibited, invalidated in a stroke by the photographic stance. This stance consists less in situating oneself in relation to the World, in retreating, coming back to it and surveying, overflying it, than in definitively abstracting oneself from it, in recognizing oneself from the start as distant, as the precessor, even; and hence, not in returning to the World, but in taking it as a simple support, or as an occasion to focus on something else - what, we do not yet know. However, if there is a type of intentionality proper to photography, if it no longer directs itself toward the World, but is only supports itself upon it, it does so, no doubt, so as to frame a universal shot which belongs rather to objective fiction. This reduction is that of a stance, and is assured by the lived-body in the most subjective or immanent of manners. Not by a rational or bloodless subject, or indeed one reduced, for example, to an eye; but by a body as absolute, uncircumventable requisite of the photographic act. The latter is at least (but not only) this stance, that which permits delivery, in a stroke, from all the onto-photo-Iogical interpretations that are merely circular but which divide themselves into the idealist, the materialist, the technologist, the empiricist, etc. Photography is not a return to the things, but a return to the body as undivided vision-force. Further, this is not a return, but a departure upon that basis constituted by the greatest naivety, a naivety which, inversely, makes possible an almost absolute disenchantment, like a disinterest for the World at the moment when the photographer adjusts the lens. The photographer does not think the World according to the World, but according to his most subjective body which , precisely for this reason, is what is most 'objective', most real in any case, in the photographic act. There is thus what we shall call a photographic finitude. It is more immediately apparent than in other arts. It is a refusal to survey and to accompany (he World or History in extenso; a subjection to the body and, consequently, to the singulariry and the finitude of the motif. Here, finitude does not mean the reception of an external given, but an impotency in regard to oneself, a powerlessness to leave oneself so as to go amongst things - the intrinsic finitude of a vision condemned to see according to itself and to remain in itself - but precisely without being, for all that, a rational subject 'looking down on' the World. The photographer spontaneously prohibits himself from exceeding or surpassing his stance, his vision, his camera, his motif. Such intrinsic finitude means that the 'photographic' body is not a site or a place, but a utopian body whose very reality, whose type of reality qua 'force', leaves it with no place in the World. Photography is a utopian activity: not because of its objects, but because of the way it grasps them, or even more, because of the origin, located in itself alone, of this way of looking.
因此——完全相同地——存在一种对世界真正的摄影的超验的还原，在某种意义上说，这种促成后者的连贯性的逻辑，确证其自身且永远更新其超验性和其视域的无穷性的逻辑，这种逻辑同样统治着世界中的日常生活，它的“源初信念”，似乎普遍地在摄影姿态的冲击下被压抑且失效了。这种姿态与其说等于在与世界的联系中定位自身，撤回、后退到世界中，审视、越过世界，更多地是将自己决绝地从世界中抽象出来，在一开始就将自身作为有距离的，甚至作为前进者；并由此不会退回到世界中去，而是将之作为一副简单的支架，或者作为聚焦于其他事物的场合——具体是什么事物我们还并不清楚。然而，如果有一类刚好朝向摄影的意向性，如果它不再将自己直接对准世界，而仅仅是在世界之上支撑着自己，那么毫无疑问，它将框定出一个不如归于对象性虚构的普遍性的镜头。这种还原出于一种姿态，并且由生活的主体以最主观或内在的方式所担保。并不是由一个理性的或僵枯的主体，或实际上沦为一只眼睛的；而是由一具对摄影行为来说绝对的，不可回避的，必要的身体。后者至少（但并非仅仅）是这样一种姿态，允许一股脑儿地传递一切无非是循环但又将自身划分为理想主义，唯物主义，技术主义，经验主义之类的照片-本体论阐释。摄影并非是对事物的返回，而是对作为未分裂的视觉力的身体的返回。更进一步，这并不是返回，而是基于由最伟大的本真性构成的基础上的出发，这种本真性反倒使一种近乎绝对的，如同摄影师调节透镜时对世界的毫不关心一样的祛魅成为可能。摄影师并不根据世界来思考世界，而是根据他最主观的身体，也正因此是最“客观的”，在摄影行为的任何情况下是最真实的。因此存在一个我们所说的摄影的边界。这一边界比其他艺术形式的（边界）更加直白明显。它是对广泛地审视和陪同世界或历史的拒绝，是对身体也因此对奇异性和主题边界的服从。在这里，边界并不意味着对某种外部赋予的接受，而是意味着面对自己的无力，对离开自身去在事物中徜徉的无力——被罚依照自己来看并滞留在自身内的视觉的内在边界——尽管如此，也并非作为一个“蔑视”着世界的理性的主体。摄影师不由自主地阻止自己超出或者越过他的姿态，他的视觉，他的相机，他的主体。这种内在的边界意味着“摄影性”身体并不是一个位置或场所，而是一具乌托邦的身体，它独有的真实，作为“力”的真实，使之无法在世界中存在。摄影是一项乌托邦式的活动：不是因为它的对象，而是因为它捕捉对象的方式，或更进一步，因为这种位于它自身中的源初的观看方式。
Universal Photographic Fiction
普遍的摄影虚构主义
Let us continue the hypothesis. The photographer has need of a stance that is, not naive, but is within naivety. He immediately postulates a use of (less than a rapport or a relation with) the World, of his body, of his camera, which renders objectivation less obvious than it might appear. Of photography as science, and perhaps for the same reason, philosophers say that it is 'objectivating', that it prioritises the object or the sign, that it supposes an ultra-objectivist 'flattening' of the World. We might ask ourselves if there is not a great misunderstanding here, a very self-interested error of perspective. Whatever correctives they apply to it, philosophers generally make use of a prism, one and the same prism, to see and to describe things: the prism of objectivation, of transcendence and exteriority, of the figuration of the WorId. This is a Greco- Occidental invariant: it might be varied, transformed, the objectivation may be differed, postponed, distorted by withdrawal and alterity, the horizon of objectivity or of presence may be taken to pieces or subjected to endless cavils, opened, split or punctured ... but a philosopher can be recognized very easily by the fact that he always supposes, if only to initiate or solicit it, the pre-existence - absolute like a mandatory structure or a necessarydestiny - of this objectivation.
让我们继续那个假说。摄影师需要一种姿态，并不本真，而是在本真性之中。他直接假定世界、他的身体、他的相机的一种使用方式（还不够成为一种融合或关联），这使得客观化不如它本应表现出来的那样明显了。对于作为科学的摄影，且或许正是出于同一个原因，哲学家声称正是“客观化”，赋予对象或符号以优先地位，推想出使世界“平质化”的极端-客观主义。我们必须问自己这里是否存在一个巨大的误解，一个视角上很利己主义的错误。无论怎样改良，哲学家总是普遍地利用一个棱镜，唯一的一个棱镜，去看、去描述事物：即那个客观化的，超验性和外在性的，世界之表象的棱镜。这是一个希腊-西方式的不变量：它可能是多样的，变化形态的，客观化可能是不同的，次要的，在回退和变更中扭曲了的，客观化或表象的视平线可能分崩离析或是屈服于无止境的苛责，开放的，被撕裂或刺穿的……但是一个哲学家可以很容易地通过这样一种事实被辨认出来，即他总是推想（只是创造或希求就好了）这一客观化的前-存在——完全像是一个强制的结构或必然的命运。
His characteristic naivety lies in not seeing that here, it is a matter, as we have said, of an auto-interpretation, an auto-position or fetishization of photography, where the latter is prematurely identified with a transcendental function, that is to say with reality. Which means that it is impossible for the philosopher, who is a naïve photographer, to think true photographic naivety and to describe it correctly.
他典型的本真性在于他无法看到，正如我们已经讲过的，这是一个自动-解答的问题，是摄影的自动-定位或拜物化，后者过早地被等同于一项超验性机能，意即等同于现实。也就是说对于那些同样是一位天真的摄影师的哲学家来说，思考真正的摄影的本真性并正确地描述它是不可能的。
Thus it cannot be said with any certainty at all of the photographer - and even less so of the science with which photography maintains, it is true, the closest of relations - that he installs himself 'in the midst' of the World, in the benveen-two of the visible and the invisible, in the phenomeno-logical distance as that which would render possible his own manifestation in tele-phenomenality. As far as flesh is concerned, he knows only that of his own body, not that of the World; he is prodigiously 'abstract' in this sense. So that, rather than imagining the basic realism of all photography as a transcendent and fetishist realism, as being rooted in perceptual 'objectivity' so as to go and seek an object still more distant than that of philosophy, in place of this raising of the stakes to which the latter automatically leads, it would suffice to invert the sense or the order of the operation: not to deduce the reality of photography's own object from the perceptual and worldly objectivity of the object, but to found its objectivity upon its reality.
因此对于所有摄影师——更不用说对于摄影所主张的科学而言，我们无法肯定，这些最切近的关系——他将自己安置在世界的“正中间”，在可视和不可视的二者之间，在使他自身的显现在远程-现象化中成为可能的现象学距离中——是真实的。只要肉体牵扯其中，他就只能了解他自己的身体而非世界；他在这一层意义上是极度抽象的、因此，并不是将所有摄影的基础现实主义想象为一种超验的拜物的现实主义，想象为植根于知觉的“客观性”以便去寻找一种比哲学的对象更为遥远的对象，为了不提高后者天然带来的风险，将操作的意义或顺序倒置一下即可：并不是从对象知觉上和字面上的客观性来推论摄影的对象的现实，而是从它的客观性之上找到它的现实。
We mean to say, with this formula, that photography must be delivered of its philosophical interpretations, which are one and all amphibological; from the confusion of the perceived object and the object in itself or of the real, of objectivity and of reality. The specific 'object', the proprium of photography, can be found in the body and in the photo, in the process that goes from one to the other; not in the World. Perhaps there is nor even - by right at least - any ontological identity, any co-propriation, any common form , of the photographic object and the photo that supposedly 'represents' it.
根据这一公式，我们想说，摄影必须从它那些两栖的哲学性阐释中分离出来；必须从被感知的对象和对象自身或者和真实、对象性以及现实相造成的混淆中分离出来。那个特别的“对象”，即摄影的本己，存在于身体和照片之中，在从一个驶向另一个的过程之中，而不存在于世界之中。或许对于摄影的对象和设以“表现”它的照片来说并不存在——至少按理说是这样——任何本体论上的本体，任何共同-本己化，以及任何普遍形式。
Wittgenstein (but also any philosopher whatsoever) postulates an a priori form common to the two orders of reality. We on the contrary distinguish them as radically heterogeneous, the occasional presence of the object of the World being quite enough, what is more, to explain what the photo represents. But what the photo represents has nothing to do ontologically with the formal being of the photo as such or as representation.
维特根斯坦（以及其他哲学家）为现实的两种秩序预设了一个普遍的先验形式。相反地，我们将这两种秩序区分为完全异质的，并且，世界中对象偶然的在场已足够解释照片表现了什么。但是照片所表现的东西与照片或表现物的正式的存在并无任何本体论上的关联。
To reprise - and radicalize - a distinction made by Husserl, we shall say that the object that is photographed or that appears 'in' the photo, an object drawn from the transcendence of the World, is wholly distinct from the photographic apparition or from the representation of that object. More rigorously: it is the latter that distinguishes itself from the former. There is a 'formal' being or a being- immanent of photographic apparition; it is, if you like, the photographic phenomenon, that which photography can manifest, or more exactly, the manner, the 'how' of its manifesting the World. This manner or this phenomenon - here is what radicalizes Husserl's distinction – distinguishes itself absolutely from the photographed object because it belongs to a wholly other sphere of reality than that of the World: to the sphere of the immanence of the stance of the body, to undivided vision-force.
为了复现——并推进——胡塞尔曾作出的一个区分，我们称被拍到的或在照片“之中”显现的那个对象，那个从世界的超验性中被拉出来的对象与摄影的幻影或这一对象的表现物完全不同。更严格地说：正是后者将自身与前者相区别开了。存在一个“形式的”存在或摄影的幻影的内在-存在；那就是摄影性现象，即可由摄影显示的，或更准确地说，是摄影“如何”显示世界的方式。这一方式，或这一现象——正是它将胡塞尔所做出的区分彻底化了——彻底地将自身与那个被拍的对象区分开，因为它属于另一个与世界范围完全不同的现实范围：属于身体姿态的内在性的范围，属于未分裂的视觉力。
What is characteristic of philosophy is always to give too much importance to the World, to believe that the photographed object exceeds its status as represented object and determ.ines or conditions the very essence of photographic representation. It postulates precisely that the object that appears 'in' a photo and its photographic apparition share the common structure or form of objectivation. Whence its ultra-objectivist interpretation of photography. Bur this is not at all the case: what does it mean for the transcendental stance to realise itself as vision-force, if not to suspend from the outset or to immediately reduce this transcendence ofthe World, and all the phenomena of authority that follow from it, and to pose all the real problems of photography as a function of the immanence of vision-force? Thus, we dualyze, that is to say, we radicalize as originary and by right - and even as unengenderable in the wake of a scission or a decision - the duality of the photographic vision and the instruments or the events that it can draw from the World. There is no photographic decision; on the other hand there is a (non-)photographic vision that is, so to speak, parallel to the World; a photographic process which has the same contents of representation as those that are in the World, but which enjoys an absolutely different transcendental status since it is by definition immanent to vision-force. This originary and in-principle duality, which will not have been produced by scission or alteration, cutting or 'differance', is obviously the condition for the two orders of reality no longer hybridizing or mutually impeding each other, as they do in philosophy. In particular, the immanent photographic process - that which concludes in the photographic manifestation - no longer allows itself to be altered, inhibited or conditioned by the photographically- manifested object. It ceases to be stopped, limited, partialized - but this also means: normalized and coded – by the World and by that which constitutes its flesh – the bifurcations, ramifications, decisions, positions, all that work of auto-representation of the World that has almost nothing to do with 'simple' photographic representation. Thus, because of this duality which replaces the reflexive distance to the World - objectivity - a new space opens up from the outset, or immediately: the quasi·space of an absolute fiction wholly distinct from the World and from the object. Of photographic representation, we must say that, even more than the sun of a unique reason illuminating the diversity of its objects, it is a vision-flux forever indivisible within the unlimited space of fiction that is the finished photo. Qua finished photo, it is also, through its pastaking in the immanent·being of the photo, radically distinguished from its material support. The materials and the supports are obviously fundamental, but they explain only the variety of the photo's representational contents . There is no longer any material or formal causality that can condition the essence or the immanent-being of the photo as vision. Doubtless, on the other hand, we will say, photography is also an art and not only a vision, a science or a knowledge. But we shall interpret it at first according to this model so as better to determine, afterward, its specific difference as art.
哲学的典型特征是总是过分地重视世界，相信被拍的对象优于其作为被表现之物的状态并决定或调节着摄影的表现物的独特本质。这恰恰假设了那个在照片“之中”显现的对象及其摄影的幻影共享客观化的普遍结构或形式。由此生成其对摄影的极端-客观主义的阐释。但事实并非如此：对于超验性姿态而言，如果没从一开始就悬置或是直接削减世界的这种超验性以及随之而来的一切权威现象，并将一切真正的摄影问题装作是视觉力内在性的一项功能，那将自身实现为视觉力又有何意义？因此，我们需使之二元化，意即，我们要源初地——甚至是以不可生成的方式，对这种割裂或决断——即摄影视觉和取自世界的工具或事件的二元性更为警觉。不存在摄影式的决断；而却存在一种（非-）摄影式视觉，即，与世界相平行；是一个在内容上与那些存在于世界之中、却因其在定义上内在于视觉力而享有完全相异的超验性地位的表现物相同的摄影过程。这种源初的、原则上的二元性，显然是现实的两种秩序条件不再像在哲学语境中那样相互混合或互相妨碍的条件，并且它无法以割裂或修正、剪辑或“延异”的方式制造出来。特别地，固有的摄影进程——以摄影的显现为终点——不再允许它自身被摄影地-显现之物所改变、抑制或约束。它不再是停止的，有限的，偏颇的——但这同样意味着：规范化和编程化——由世界和组成它的身体的东西——分歧，分枝，决断，位置，一切几乎与“直白的”摄影表达毫无关系的世界的自动-表达来进行。因此，由于这种二元性取代了朝向世界的倒映程——客观性——一个新的空间就在开端或当下立刻开放了：一个类似于绝对虚拟的空间，并且完全区别于世界和对象。在摄影的显现之物中，我们必须承认，有一个比太阳还要独特的原因照亮了它的对象的多样性，那是一个在虚拟的无限空间内永远是一个整体的视觉流，即一张已完成的照片。作为已完成的照片，它通过对照片的内在-存在的参与，彻底地与它的物质依托相区分开了。物质材料的依托显然是基础性的，但它们仅能释照片显现内容的种类。没有任何物质或形式上的因果关系能够像视觉那样决定照片的本质或照片的内在-存在。然而毫无疑问的是，我们会说，摄影不仅是一种视觉，一门科学或一种知识，摄影还是一门艺术。但我们需首先根据这种模式来阐释它，以便稍后更好地确定它作为艺术时的详细区别。
The duality of the reproduced object and of its manifestation in the photographic mode allows us to understand what the latter grasps in principle, what it is. The photo - not in its material support, but in its being-photo of the object - is none other than that which, through visionforce, is given immediately as the 'in-itself' of the object. Just as we have eliminated the philosophical type of objectivity, we must, to be coherent, eliminate the 'in-itself' that corresponds to it, for example the idea of common sense (internalized and transformed by a philosophy that supposes it so as to overturn it) according to which the perceived object exists in itself. The photo, owing to its being immanent on one hand, to its reference to the perceived object on the other, is incontestably the in-itself of that object. But the in·itself is no longer continuous with the perceived-being, it is even separated from the latter by a philosophically-unbridgeable abyss. By in-itself, we designate what is most objective or exterior, but also what is most stable in that which is capable of being given to vision: objectivity and stability no longer as attributes or properties of the perceived object, but as they might be given and lived in their turn on the basis of immanent vision alone. They are not given within a horizon and limited by it, nor, on the other hand, do they themselves form an horizon of presence limited by objects. In their
lived-being, they are solely immanent; in their specific content, they describe a quasi-field of presence empty not only of present objects, but of all syntax, structure or articulation, of all 'philosophical decision'. As to the object itself and the technological ingredients, they remain in the World without penetrating in the slightest into the photographic process itself.
复现的对象和它在摄影模式下的显现的二元性使我们能够理解后者原则上是如何领悟自身的。照片——并非作为它的物质依托，而是作为对象的照片式存在——无非就是被视觉力立即赋予的对象的“自在”。正如我们已排除掉的哲学式的客观性，我们仍要一以贯之地排除与之相对应的“自在”，例如认知对象是自在之物这一普遍观点（某种哲学先假定这一普遍观点并加以内化和改造以推翻它）。一方面因为它的内在性，另一方面由于它对于认知对象的参照，照片无疑就是那一对象的自在。但是这一自在已经不再与被认知的存在物相续连，它甚至与后者之间存在一道哲学意义上的不可逾越的鸿沟。对于自在，我们指定什么是最客观的和最外在的，以及能被视觉捕捉的事物中什么是最稳定的：客观性和稳定性不再作为认知对象的属性或性质，而是有可能仅仅基于内在视觉而依次被给予并发挥作用。他们并非是在一个界域内被给予并受其限制，也不是他们自身形成一个由对象所限制的存在域。作为有生命的存在者时，他们仅仅是内在的；关于他们的具体内容，他们描述了一个存在的类-场域，不仅缺少在场的对象，还缺失一切句法，结构或衔接，以及一切“哲学式决断”。至于对象本身和技术成分，他们停留在世界中，未曾穿透摄影过程分毫。
It is this that explains why the photographic apparition is not a subtilized double ofthe object, endowed with the indices of the imaginary. It is a pure a priori image, an ideality that is 'objective' but without the limits of (specific, generic, philosophical) idealization, that is to say without transcendent decision or position. It is ideality, we might say, before any process of idealization. Vision does not 'shoot' a pure image; more exactly, a pure image is given to it, in an immanent mode, an image which does not visualize the operation of shooting, but is what is shot, the transcendent object; and which, without touching it refers to it as mere 'signal' or 'occasion'. To immanent vision, 'in-itself' or non-thetic, non-self-positional objectivity is given in a manner itself non-objectivating; and this photographic objectivity does not simply extend spontaneous perception. On the one hand, vision-force only makes use of the World as a support or reservoir of occasions (an 'occasionalist' conception of photography) without abstractly redoubling it. On the other, it gives itself directly and in totality, uncut, the distance of objectivity that is photographic apparition or the photographic a priori of the World, and which is given to it in itself and as a whole, without being divided and reflected in itself. The photographer fixes on the negative-support, the a priori negative or the possible, universal and non-thetic film, through whose medium, at least as much as through his camera, he looks at or sees the World without ever framing it for himself.
这也解释了为什么摄影的幻影并非是在想象力的引导下精细地复刻对象。它是纯粹的先验图像，一个“客观的”但不受（具体的，一般的，哲学的）理念化限制的虚构体，即不含任何超验的决断或定位。可以说，是这个虚构体先于任何理念化的过程。并不是视觉“拍摄到”一张纯粹的图片；更准确地说，一张纯粹的图片，以一种内在的方式，一张并不呈现拍摄的动作而作为被拍下的，那个超验性的对象的图片，被呈递给视觉；并且，未经触碰时，它将仅仅被称为‘标志’或‘场景’。对于内在的视觉来说，“自在”或非-设定性的，非自我定位的客观性在某种意义上使得自身非-客观化；这种摄影的客观性也并不是简单地延伸无意识知觉。一方面，视觉力只是将世界用作场景（摄影中的“机缘主义”概念）的支撑或储存池而不再对它进行任何抽象地重复。另一方面，它直接地、整体地、赋予自身客观性的距离，即一帧未剪的摄影的幻影或是世界的摄影的先验性，在其自身内作为一个整体被给予，而不曾被分割或倒映过。摄影师专注于依托底片，专注于先验的底片或是合理的、普遍的、非-设定性的胶卷，他通过他的媒介，至少是尽量地通过他的摄像机看向或看着世界，不曾自为地对其加以构画。
Thus, to the photographic as 'stance' there does not correspond a fai lure of objectivity, but an objectivity other than the philosophical kind: an irreflective, non-circular objectivity, a simplified objectivity, so to speak. Photography is one of the great media that have put an end to the empirico-transcendental doublet, that have separated or 'dualyzed' the latter in definitively non-contemporary orders, impossible to re-synthesize philosophically_ Photography is the description of a real that is no longer structured in a transcendent manner by philosophy's doublets or unities-of-contraries, by the exchanges and redoublings of perception. It has never installed itself in the gap between the visible and the invisible. It is a visionforce which sterilizes the perceptual pretention proper to the World. What is apparently the most objectivating art is in fact the one that best destroys objectivation, because it is the most realist - but this is a realism of immanence rather than of transcendence ... In dismissing faith in perception to the margins of photography, the risk is obviously that it will only be all the better exhibited in it, will return all the more into it. But this doesn't change the fact that photography has never been - in its essence, we don't speak of the spontaneous finalities conveyed by the photographer - an aid to perception (its analysis, its clarification, etc.). Photography has its own ' intention' - it is that quasi-field of pure photographic apparition, of the universal photographic Appearance or Fiction (that of the vision-stance) . And it is philosophically sterile: photography takes place in an immanent manner, it has nothing to prove, and it doesn't even necessarily have a will - for example, to critique and to transfonn the World, the City, History, etc.
因此，作为“姿态”的摄影性并不等同于客观性的失败，而是符合于一种非哲学式的客观性：一种未加深思的，非-循环的客观性，或可以说是一种简化的客观性。摄影是最伟大的媒介之一，摄影终结了经验-超验的二元结构，以一种完全非当代的规则将后者分离出去或“二元化”，使其不能重新哲学地综合。摄影是对一种真实的描述，这种真实不再被哲学的二元结构或对立物的统一体，被知觉的交换或再加倍以一种超验的方式建构。它从未在可见与不可见之间的裂隙中置放自身。它是一种视觉力，为世界消去知觉的佯装。事实上最客观化的艺术就是将客观化摧毁得最彻底的艺术，因为那是最真实的——但这是一种内在性的写实，而非是超验的写实…从摄影的边界中去除对知觉的信念当然会有风险：它将只会在其中更好地被展示，并进一步回归到这种信念之中。但这并不会改变这一事实，即摄影从来不是——是按其本质来说，我们并不讨论摄影师输出的那些无意识的尾片——知觉的外援（它的分析，它的阐明等等）。摄影有它自己的“目的”——它是纯粹的摄影的幻影的类-场域，是普遍的摄影表象或（视觉-姿态的）虚构的类场域。并且它不含任何哲学成分：摄影以一种内在的方式进行，没有东西要被证明，它甚至也不需要什么意图——例如，去批判和改造世界、城市、历史等等。
This in-itself of the World, we must affirm that photography gives it, that photography is in no way a double, a specular image of the World, obtained by division or decision of the latter; a copy, and a bad one, of an original. Between the perceived and phenomenal photographic perception, there is no longer - as we have said - the decision from the original to the copy, or from the copy to the simulacrum. The photo is not a degradation of the World, but a process which is ' parallel' to it and which is played out elsewhere than within it - a profoundly utopian process,' unlimited ' by right rather than merely 'open'. Aparallelprocess, not inscribed in the World: and certainly not one of the divergent lines of development that continue to make the World. We shall no longer say, then, that photography is a generalized simulacrum, a topology of the simulacrum, a traversing of a thousand surfaces: A Thousand photos ... A Thousand photos, this is still the idea that the worldly and transcendent materiality of the photo belong to the latter. Whereas if its being-immanent is rigorously maintained so as to affirm its reality, there is no longer need of a thousand photos, of an unlimited-becoming-photographic; 'a' photo, one solitary photo alone, is enough to satisfy the photographic intention and to fulfill it. To do otherwise would still be to allow immanent photo-being to be limited by the transcendence of surfaces - the immanent photo-being that is absolutely devoid of all surface and all topology, even though it is 'described' as a universal 'quasi-space', even more universal than any topology.
我们必须认定摄影赋予了世界的自在，摄影不会是从世界的分裂或决断中得到的克隆体或镜面影像；也不是一件拙劣的赝品。在知觉的和现象的摄影知觉之间，不再有——正如我们说过的——关于原件与复制品或复制品与拟像的决断。照片不是对世界的降维，而是一个“平行于”世界并且在世界之外被完成的过程——一个极其乌托邦式的过程，不仅是“开放的”，还是“无限的”。一个平行的过程，不在世界中被题写：也绝不是不断创造出世界的那些发散的线程中的某一条。因此，我们不再认为摄影是一种广义上的拟像，一种拟像的拓扑学，一种对一千个表面的的贯穿：一千张照片…一千张照片，这仍然认为照片的世俗的、超验的物质性属于后者。然而如果它的内在-存在被严格地保存下来并以此肯定它的实存，那就不再需要一千张照片，不再需要一种无限的-即将到来的-摄影性；“一张”照片，仅仅是单独的一张照片就足以满足摄影的目的并实现这个目的。其他举措仍然意味着允许照片内在的存在被表面的超验性所限制——照片的内在存在不包含任何表面和拓扑学，虽然它被“描述”为一种比任何拓扑学都更普遍的“类-空间”。
For such a quasi-space belongs to the photo at once as possible or universal and as in-itself of the object. In the photographic phenomenon thought according to vision-force, are reconciled the most universal possible and the in-itself or the reality of objects. This is why we are obliged to posit an identity where philosophy posits an opposition. But still this is not a unitary or philosophical an absolutely unlimited 'surface' - empty of all bifurcation and decision - of fiction, an a priori quasi-field of fiction. This field is no longer transcendental, properly speaking - only the vision-stance is - it is no more than a priori. But this field of fiction is real , rigorously real by virtue of its essence in the vision-stance. Photography does not produce bad fiction or a standardized imaginary – or only when it renounces its essence and putS itself 'at the service' of the authorities of the World, of History, of the City, etc. It produces the only fiction that is real in rhe only mode in which it can be: not from itself and through reflection in itself or through a fetishizing auto-position, but through its essence - an essence which, yet, is in its turn absolutely distinct from it and not conditioned by it.
因为这样一个属于照片的类-空间既是可能的或普遍的，同时又是对象的自在。根据视觉力，在摄影现象思想中，最普遍可能的东西和对象的内在或实存将协调一致。这就是为什么在哲学假设一种对立的时候我们必须要假设一种本体。但这也不是一种单一的或哲学式的本体：摄影制造、贯穿并描述一种虚构的绝对无限的“表面”——没有任何分歧和决断——虚构的先验类-场域。确切地说，这一场域不再是超验的——只有视觉-姿态是的——它只是先验的。但这一虚构的场域是真实的，严格地因其在视觉-姿态中的本质的优点而真实。摄影不会制造低劣的虚构或一种标准化的想象——除了它放弃自己的本质并驱使自己“服务于”世界、历史、城市之类的权威的时候。它仅以它唯一可能的方式制造唯一一种真实的虚构：不是通过它对自身的倒映或通过的拜物化的自动-定位，而是通过它的本质——这一本质业已与它完全区别开来，并不再受它控制。
Photography is thus a passion of that knowledge that remains immanent to vision and that renounCeS faith-in-the-World. In principle the photographer does not do ontology, or theology, or topology. One could even say that he is too ascetic to 'do photography', above all if one understands the latter as a way of reflecting the World and reflecting oneself in it, of commenting on it interminably or of accompanying it. This conception of photography is to its real essence what a cliche is to rigorous thinking: a philosophical artefact, an effect of the onto-photologic that renders impossible a faithful description of photographic phenomenaliry; a supplementary negative, a cliche produced by the philosophical 'camera' or the photographico-transcendental hybrid. An attempt to photograph photography (the philosopher as self-portrait of the photographer) rather than describing it as a thinking.
因此摄影是一种知识的激情，这种知识始终内在于视觉中并拒斥对世界的信念。原则上来说，摄影师并不搞本体论，或神学，或拓扑学。如果有谁要说他太过禁欲而不能搞“摄影”，那么首先要能将后者理解为一种倒映世界、在世界倒映自身的方式，一种不停批判它或伴随着它的方式。这种摄影的概念，相较于它真正的本质，就如同相较于严格的思考而言的陈词滥调：一种哲学的人造物，一种致使摄影现象性的如实描述成为不可能的照片-本体论的影响；一张补充性的底片，一种由哲学的“相机”或由摄影性-超验性的混合物制造出的陈词滥调。一种拍摄摄影（作为摄影师的自画像的哲学家）的尝试，而非将其描述为一种思考。
However, as we have described it, the universal photographic Fiction, that is to say the photo considered no longer in its representational content, but in its essence or its immanent-being, only 'refers us back' to that essence or to the vision-force characterized by its in division or its status of Identity. This referring-back is not immediate: the photo represents the World - in a specular manner, and through its content; but it reflects its own essence in a non-specular manner, it reflects vision-force without ever reproducing it. We will say that it represents it 'only in the last instance' and that that which it describes in this non-philosophical mode of description is necessarily always an identi ty, the identity 'in-itself' of vision-force, of the subject as vision-stance. In a word, and to bring together this first analysis into a formula: in its essence all photography is 'photo-ID', identity-photography - but only in the last instance; this is why photography is a fiction that does not so much add to the World as substitute itself for the World.
然而，正如我们所描述过的，普遍的摄影虚构主义，即照片不再考虑其具象化的内容，而是关注其本质或其内在-存在，只“使我们重回”那一本质中或以其统一性或同一性状态为特征的视觉力中。这一重提并不是一蹴而就的：照片表现了世界——以一种镜面倒映的方式，通过它的内容来表现；但它以一种非-镜面的方式倒映自己的本质，它倒映视觉力而从不复制视觉力。我们会说它“只在后一种情况中”表达自身，它以这种非-哲学的描述方式描述的必然总是一个本体，一种视觉力的、一种作为视觉-姿态的主体的“自在”本体。简而言之，将这最初的分析总结为一个公式：所有摄影在其本质上是“照片-ID”，本体-摄影——但仅在后一种情况下；这就是为什么摄影是一种虚构主义，它并非是加入这个世界，而是使自己替代世界。
原书链接：https://www.douban.com/doubanapp/dispatch/book/20472039
