第三批判——译者导言（方法论）
pp. 37-39. ‘‘Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment’’: ‘‘Methodology.’’
1. Kant begins with several sections on the theory of organic reproduc- tion, in which he almost but not quite argues for the possibility of a proto-Darwinian theory of evolution: he argues that merely mechanical means (adaptation, although not yet natural selection) could account for variations in the form of living species, but not for the origins of life itself (§ 80).
2. The heart of this part of the work, however, concerns the question of how we are to apply the idea of a purpose for nature as a whole to which we have been led by the preceding arguments. Again Kant reminds us that if we take a purely naturalistic view of nature, we cannot pick out anything in it, even mankind considered as one more natural species, as its ultimate end or purpose (§§ 82–3); the experience of organisms can lead us to the idea of a purpose, but, as an idea of the merely reflecting power of judgment, cannot by itself make this idea determinate.
3. In order to make the idea of a purpose for nature determinate, we need to introduce an end that has unconditional value, something that can only be an end and not in turn a means for something else – and the only candidate for this is humanity itself, not as a merely natural species but as a moral being (§ 84). To be an end of nature, however, mankind in its moral capacity must be thought of as existing in nature, and this means that it cannot be merely human virtue that is the end of nature, but a natural condition, namely human happiness, although happiness as the product of human virtue.
4. In other words, it must be what Kant calls the ‘‘highest good,’’ the maximal possible human happiness as the product of human virtue, that is seen as the ultimate end of nature.
5. Once again, of course, Kant stresses that this is not a theoretical claim about nature, but a regulative principle that can lead us to apply our powers in behalf of this end, which is already set for us by morality itself.
目的论证明的根本指向：道德与最高善。This is a new argument for Kant: previously he had argued only that morality itself requires us to think of nature as suitable for the realization of the moral object of the highest good（This is the argument that leads to the postulate of God as the author of the laws of nature in the ‘‘Dialectic’’ of the Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 124–5）, but now he argues that what starts out as a purely scientific experience, the observation of organisms in nature, inevitably leads us to the thought of a purpose for nature that can only be provided by morality.
The ‘‘crowning phase’’ of the critical philosophy is thus the recognition that science and morality ultimately bring us to the same place: starting from either, we come to see that nature can and must be seen as the sphere in which human beings not only can but must attempt to establish an order in which each can work for happiness in harmony with the happiness of all. Aesthetics can prepare us for morality, but teleology reveals the full power of its demand.
The remainder of the ‘‘Methodology’’ explores the limits of teleology as the basis for a theoretical proof of the existence of God (§ 85) and its power as the basis for a moral proof of the existence of God (§§ 86–91). In these sections Kant expands upon arguments given in the first two Critiques, such as his argument that only the need to postulate the existence of God as the condition for the possibility of realizing the highest good can justify us in attributing omniscience, omnipo- tence, and omnibenevolence to our conception of him. （ § 86, 5:444）
He then concludes with one of his most detailed discussions of what he means by a moral rather than theoretical proof (§§ 90–1), complementing his dis- cussions of this issue in the first two Critiques and also in the Ja ̈sche Logic（See Pure Reason, A 820–30/B 848–58; Practical Reason, 5:134–46; and Ja ̈sche Logic, 9:86–7. These sections merit careful study by every student of Kant – as does indeed the whole Critique of the Power of Judgment.
