翻译 The Deflationary Theory of Truth第7.4~7.6节

7.4 Objection #4: Consistency and Adequacy 一致性和适当性

One of the major tasks of philosophical logic in the twentieth century has been to provide a theory of truth that can deal with the ancient problem of the liar paradox. Consider the following proposition.

在二十世纪，哲学逻辑的主要任务之一是提供一种可以解决古代说谎者悖论问题的真理论。考虑以下命题。

(The Liar) The Liar is not true.

If we accept the relevant instance of (ES-prop) for The Liar, and classical logic, then contradiction quickly follows. Moreover, since deriving this contradiction does not rely on the supposition that some proposition is neither true nor false, appealing to a weak notion of truth will not help with this problem. Indeed, since the weak notion of truth implies that all instances of (ES-prop) are true, it is precisely this notion of truth that allows the contradiction to be derived. A stronger notion of truth that restricted (ES-prop) in certain ways might be able to avoid the liar paradox.

（The Liar）这句谎言不是真的。

如果我们接受了The Liar的（ES-prop）的相关例示和经典逻辑，那么矛盾很快就会出现。而且，由于得出这种矛盾并不依赖于某些命题既非真非假的假设，因此诉诸弱真概念将无助于解决这个问题。确实，由于弱真概念意味着（ES-prop）的所有例示都是真的，因此正是这种真概念产生了矛盾。一个强真概念通过特定方式限制了（ES-prop），也许能够避免说谎者悖论。

Partly for this reason, a number of philosophers have recently argued that The Liar poses a special problem for deflationary theories of truth (see Beall and Armour-Garb (eds.) 2005). That is, since it is unclear whether deflationists can appeal to a strong notion of truth, they seem to be at a special disadvantage in dealing with the liar paradox. Moreover, it has been argued that one particular way of motivating a restriction of (ES-prop) is incompatible with deflationism: namely, that paradoxical sentences like The Liar are meaningless, or do not express propositions. (Armour-Garb 2001; but see Beall 2001 for a contrary view.)

部分由于这个原因，很多哲学家近期指出，说谎者悖论对真之紧缩论提出了一个特别的问题 (见 Beall and Armour-Garb (eds.) 2005)。即因为不清楚紧缩论者能否诉诸强真概念，所以他们似乎在处理说谎者悖论的时候处于劣势。更进一步的，有人认为，某种特定对（ES-prop）施以限制的方式——比如，像说谎者悖论这样的自相矛盾的句子没有意义的或不表达命题——与紧缩论不相容。

However, as we mentioned above, not all deflationary theories are committed to the truth of all instances of (ES-prop). Horwich's minimal theory of truth, for example, only consists of all the non-pathological instances of (ES-prop). One possible deflationist response to The Liar, then, is to simply bar the problematic instances of (ES-prop) from the theory of truth. There are several problems with this strategy. For one, by making this ad hoc manoeuvre we lose the ability to explain why the pathological instances of (ES-prop) are pathological. After all, it is surely something about the concept of truth, and in particular the role of the relevant instances of (ES-prop), that explains why the liar paradox arises (Soames 1999, Gupta 2006). Another problem is that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to spell out in advance which instances of (ES-prop) are paradoxical (Kripke 1975, McGee 1992, Yablo 1993). A final problem is that it appears we need to assume that the paradoxical instances of (ES-prop) are true if we are to assert (11) (Armour-Garb 2004, Gupta 2006).

但是，就如我们上面所提到的，不是所有的紧缩论都承诺所有的（ES-prop）例示都为真。例如，Horwich的极小主义真理论仅由所有非病态的（ES-prop）例示构成。因此，紧缩论者对说谎者悖论的一个可能的回应是，从真理论中简单地拒绝那些成问题的（ES-prop）例示。但这一策略会有一些问题。首先，通过进行这种临时操作，我们无法解释（ES-prop）的病态例示为何是病态的。毕竟，，毫无疑问，那些关于真概念的东西，尤其是（ES-prop）的相关例示的作用，解释了说谎者悖论会出现的原因(Soames 1999, Gupta 2006)。另一个问题是，预先说明哪些（ES-prop）例示是悖论性的，但这即使不是完全不可能，也是十分困难的。最后一个问题是，如果我们要断言（11），似乎我们需要假设（ES-prop）的悖论例示为真(Armour-Garb 2004, Gupta 2006)。

(11) All inclusive disjunctions are true if and only if one of the disjuncts is true.

These problems facing accounts that merely restrict the instances of the equivalence schema suggest an alternative deflationist response to the liar. For both the fact that The Liar's instance of (ES-prop) is required to explain its (The Liar's) pathology, and the fact that we need The Liar's instance of (ES-prop) to assert (11), give us good reason to suppose that even the paradoxical instances of (ES-prop) are true. Moreover, these reasons hold whether we are deflationists or inflationists. If this is right, then, since the paradox is generated merely from the relevant instance of (ES-prop) by classical logic, The Liar poses no special problem for deflationists (Gupta 2006). And since everyone's problem is no one's, the liar paradox cannot be used against deflationists. This defence of deflationism can be bolstered by noting that, like inflationists, deflationists can try to deal with the liar paradox by modifying classical logic (Field 2003), by adopting epistemicism (Restall 2006), or by adopting a revision theory (Gupta and Belnap 1993). (See also Maudlin 2004.)

（11）所有包含式的析取均为真，当且仅当其中一项析取为真。

仅仅限制等值模式的例示的这些解释所面临的问题表明，紧缩论者对说谎者悖论可以采取另一种回应。无论是为解释（说谎者的）病态性，还是为了断言（11），我们都需要说谎者的（ES-prop）例示。这两点都给了我们理由去支持，悖论性的（ES-prop）例示也是真的。此外，无论我们是紧缩论者还是膨胀论者，这些理由都成立。如果这是对的，那么，因为该悖论仅仅因为经典逻辑的相关（ES-prop）例示而被产生的，因此说谎者悖论并非只对紧缩论者而言是一个问题(Gupta 2006)。既然这是所有人都面临的问题，说谎者悖论就不能被用来反驳紧缩论者。这种对紧缩论的辩护还可以被进一步被增强，因为像膨胀论者一样，紧缩论者也可以试图通过修改经典逻辑(Field 2003) 、采纳认知主义(Restall 2006)、或采纳某种修正理论(Gupta and Belnap 1993).来处理说谎者悖论。(See also Maudlin 2004.)

However, there is a further line of argument that suggests there is a special problem for deflationists in this vicinity. The ideal theory of truth will be both consistent (e.g. avoids the liar paradox) and adequate (e.g. allows us to derive all the essential laws of truth, like (11)). Yet it has been recently argued that even if deflationists can give a consistent theory of truth, they cannot provide an adequate theory. The argument for this conclusion turns on the notion of a conservative extension of a theory. Informally, a conservative extension of a theory is one that does not allow us to prove any sentences that couldn't be proved from the original, unextended theory. More formally, and applied to theories of truth, a truth theory, Tr is conservative over some theory T formulated in language L if and only if for every sentence φ of L in which the truth predicate doesn't occur, if Tr ∪ L ⊢ φ, then L ⊢ φ. As is well known, certain truth theories are conservative over arithmetic — e.g. theories that implicitly define truth using only the instances of (ES-prop) — and certain truth theories are not — e.g. Tarski's compositional theory (Tarski 1944). Specifically, the addition of certain truth theories allows us to prove that arithmetic is consistent, something we famously can't do if we are confined to arithmetic itself.

但是，仍然有进一步的论证表明，对于紧缩论者而言，这方面存在特别的问题。理想的真理论既是一致的（例如避免说谎者悖论）又是适当的（例如允许我们推导出所有基本的真理定律，如（11））。但近期已经有人论证了，即使紧缩论者可以给出一个一致的真理论，他们也不能给出一个适当的理论。该论证的结论基于理论的保守扩张观念。不正式的说法是，一种理论的保守扩张不允许我们证明任何这样的句子，这种句子无法从初始的、非扩张的理论中得到证明。更正式的说法是，并且对于诸真理论而言都适用的是，一个真理论，Tr对于用语言L构造的理论T而言是保守的，当且仅当，对L中的所有句子φ（在这些句子中没有真谓词），如果Tr ∪ L ⊢ φ，那么 L ⊢ φ。众所周知，某些真理论对于算术是保守的——如仅使用（ES-prop）例示来对真做隐定义的理论——而某些真理论不是——如塔斯基的组合理论(Tarski 1944)。具体来说，某些真理论的添加使我们能够证明算术是一致的，但如果我们局限于算术本身，那众所周知，我们无法证明它是一致的。

Now, it has recently been argued (a) that conservative truth theories are inadequate and (b) deflationists are committed to conservative truth theories (Shapiro 1998, Ketland 1999). The details of the arguments for (a) are complicated and we will pass over them here (but see Field 1999 for criticism). To get a flavour of the arguments for (b), consider Shapiro's rhetorical question: ‘How thin can the notion of arithmetic truth be, if by invoking it we can learn more about the natural numbers?’ Shapiro is surely right to press deflationists on their frequent claims that truth is 'thin' or 'insubstantial'. It might also be a worry for deflationists if any adequate truth theory allowed us to derive non-logical truths, given the common deflationist assertion that truth is a logical property. On the other hand, deflationists themselves insist that truth is an expressively useful device, and so they cannot be faulted merely for promoting a theory of truth that allows us to say more about matters not involving truth. Whether there is more of a worry for deflationists in the non-conservativeness of certain truth-theories depends on subtle questions about what sort of axioms count as essential laws of truth and whether all conservative truth theories are inadequate (Shapiro 1998, Field 1999, Ketland 1999). Perhaps most importantly, though, the debate over conservativeness highlights how unclear we are about the commitments of deflationism.

此外，最近有人指出：（a）保守的真理论是不适当的；（b）紧缩论者致力于保守的真理论(Shapiro 1998, Ketland 1999)。（a）的论证细节很复杂，所以我们在这里略过（批评可见Field 1999）。为了理解论点（b）的，请考虑Shapiro的修辞问题：“如果通过调用算术真我们可以学习更多关于自然数的信息，算术真的概念可以稀薄到什么程度？” Shapiro无疑是紧缩论的追随者，因为他们经常声称真是“稀薄的”或“非实质性的”。考虑到通常紧缩论者断言说真是一个逻辑属性，如果任何适当的真理论使得我们能够产生非逻辑的真理的话，这对紧缩论者而言也可能是个困难。另一方面，紧缩论者自己也会坚持：真是一种在表达上有用的工具，因此不能仅仅因为提倡这样一种，使得我们更多地谈论东西而不涉及真的真理论，就指责他们。紧缩论者是否会在某些真理论的非保守性上面临更多困难，这取决于一个微妙的问题，即什么样的公理可算作真的本质定律，以及是否所有保守的真理论都是不适当的(Shapiro 1998, Field 1999, Ketland 1999)。但也许最重要的是，关于保守性的争论突显了我们对于紧缩论的承诺的理解是有多么的不清晰。

7.5 Objection #5: Normativity. 规范性

It is commonly said that our beliefs and assertions aim at truth. The idea here, of course, is not that our beliefs and assertions are always true in a statistical sense, or even that they are mostly true. The idea is rather that truth is a norm of assertion. This fact about assertion and truth has often been seen to suggest that deflationism must be false. However, the felt contradiction between normativity and deflationism is difficult to make precise.

通常我们会说我们的信念和断言都指向真。当然，这里的这个想法不是说我们的信念和断言在统计学意义上都为真，甚至不是在大多数情况下为真。这个想法不如说是，真是断言的规范之一。这一关于断言和真的事实经常被认为暗示了紧缩论是错的。但是，这种在规范性和紧缩论之间的矛盾的感觉很难被澄清。

The first thing to say is that there is certainly a sense in which deflationism is not inconsistent with the idea that truth is a norm of assertion. To illustrate this, notice that we can obtain an intuitive understanding of the content of this idea without mentioning truth at all, so long as we focus on a particular case. Suppose for whatever reason that Mary sincerely believes that snow is green, has good evidence for this belief, and on the basis of this belief and evidence asserts that snow is green. We might say that there is a norm of assertion which implies that Mary is in this case open to criticism. After all, since snow is evidently not green, there must be something incorrect or defective about Mary's assertion that it is. It is this incorrection or defectiveness that the idea that truth is a norm of assertion is trying to capture.

首先，在特定意义上，紧缩论的确与“真是断言所拥有的规范之一”矛盾。为了阐明这一点，请注意，只要只关注特定情况，我们就能够直观理解某想法的内容，而无需提及任何事实。假设出于任何原因，玛丽真诚地相信雪是绿色的，她有充分的证据证明这一信念，并在此信念和证据的基础上断言雪是绿色的。我们可以说断言中存在一种规范，这意味着玛丽在这种情况下可以受到批评。毕竟，由于雪显然不是绿色的，因此关于玛丽的断言肯定存在某些错误或缺陷。这正是“真是断言所拥有的规范之一”的观点试图抓住的错误或缺陷。

But now let us see if we can give a general statement of the norm that lies behind this particular case. The problem of providing a general statement seems to be difficult, and for reasons that by now should be familiar. To state the norm in general we would need to be able to do something we cannot really do, namely, to complete an infinite conjunction of something like the following form:

但是现在让我们看看是否我们能够给出一个该例子背后的关于规范的一般性的陈述。问题在于，出于一个现在我们很熟悉的原因，给出一个一般性的陈述似乎是困难的。为了一般性地说明该规范，我们也许需要做一些我们实际上做不到的事，即，完成一个关于一些东西的无限长的合取式，就像这种形式：

If someone asserts that snow is green, and snow is not green then he or she is open to criticism, and if someone asserts that grass is purple, and grass is not purple then he or she is open to criticism,…and so on.

如果有人断言雪是绿的，而雪不是绿的，那么他或她就可以遭受批评；并且如果有人断言草是紫色的，而草不是紫色的，那么他或她就可以遭受批评……等等

Given the equivalence schema (F-prop*) provided by the deflationary theory of falsity, however, this infinite conjunction can be reformulated as:

但考虑到这个等值模式(F-prop*)是由紧缩论的错误所给定的，这个无限合取式可能被如此重构：

If someone asserts that snow is green and the proposition that snow is green is false, then he or she is open to criticism, and if someone asserts that grass is purple and the proposition that grass is purple is false, then he or she is open to criticism, and so on.

如果有人断言雪是绿的，并且命题“雪是绿的”是错的，那么他或她就可以遭受批评；并且如果有人断言草是紫色的，并且命题“草是紫色的”是错的，那么他或她就可以遭受批评……等等

In turn, this reformulated infinite conjunction can be reformulated as a statement whose universal quantifier ranges over propositions:

反过来，可以将这种重构的无限合取式重构为一条陈述，其全称量词的范围涵盖诸命题：

For all propositions p, if someone asserts that p, and p is false, then he or she is open to criticism

对于所有命题p，如果有人断言p，并且p是错的，那么他或她就可以遭受批评。

Or, to put it as some philosophers might:

Truth is a norm of assertion.

或者，有些哲学家会这么说：

真是断言所拥有的规范之一。

For after all, if truth is a norm of assertion, then, if you assert something false, you are open to criticism. In short, then, deflationists are certainly not denying that truth is a norm of assertion; on the contrary, the concept of truth is required to state that very generalization.

总之，如果真是断言所拥有的规范之一，那么，如果你断言了错误的东西，你就可以遭受批评。简而言之，紧缩论者并不会否认真是断言所拥有的规范，相反，为了断言一般性的东西，我们需要真概念。

If the problem of normativity is not the straightforward one that deflationists cannot account for the idea that truth is a norm of assertion, what is the problem? Crispin Wright argues that the problem is not so much that deflationists cannot account for normativity; rather, he suggests that the problem is twofold: first, that any theory of truth that does account for normativity is ipso facto not a deflationary theory properly so-called, and second, that any theory of truth which employs the equivalence schemas can account for normativity (Wright 1992; and see Price 1998 for discussion). The result is that, since most contemporary varieties of deflationism evidently employ the equivalence schemas, most contemporary varieties of deflationism are not varieties of deflationism properly so-called.

如果规范性问题不是“紧缩论者不能解释真是断言所拥有的规范之一”这一直接的问题，那么问题是什么？Crispin Wright认为，问题不在于紧缩论者不能解释规范性。而是在于，这个问题是双重的：首先，任何能够解释规范性的真理论本质上都不是一般所言的紧缩论；其次，任何采用等值模式的真理论都能够解释规范性(Wright 1992; and see Price 1998 for discussion)。结果是，由于现在大多数版本的紧缩论显然采用了等值模式，因此现在大多数版本的紧缩论并不是一般所言的紧缩论。

Wright's objection from normativity is a difficult one to assess. For one thing, it is difficult to find Wright's reason for supposing that the equivalence schemas play such a central role in the explanation of normativity. As we have seen, the equivalence schemas are crucial in providing a general statement of the idea that truth is a norm of assertion, but there seems for all that no internal connection between truth and the norm in question, and thus no internal connection between the equivalence schemas and that norm (cf. Price 1998). Nor is it clear what role normativity plays in the distinction between an inflationary and a deflationary theory of truth. Certainly it is not good enough to simply define deflationism so that any deflationary theory cannot account for normativity. Of course, it is a consequence of a definition of this sort that a theory of truth is either inflationary or false; but then again, no deflationist will accept the definition.

Wright从规范性导出的反驳是很难被评价的。一方面，很难找到Wright支持这一点的理由，即为什么等值模式在解释规范性中扮演了中心地位。就如我们已经看到的，对于为“真是断言所拥有的规范”这个想法提供一个一般性的陈述，等值模式是很关键的。但似乎总的来看，在真与那个尚待讨论的规范之间并没有内在联系，因此在等值模式与那个规范之间也没有内在联系(cf. Price 1998)。我们也不清楚规范性在紧缩的和膨胀的真理论之间的区分中起什么作用。的确，用它来定义紧缩论，以至于任何的紧缩论都无法解释规范性，是不够好的。显而易见的是，这种定义的结果是，真理论要么是膨胀的，要么是错的；但是话又说回来，没有紧缩论者会接受这个定义。

Whatever one thinks of the details of Wright's objection, however, it does have far-reaching consequences for deflationism about truth. What the objection forces us to consider is the possibility that there is no very clear distinction between an inflationary and a deflationary theory of truth. Indeed, this possibility — that there is no clear inflationary/deflationary distinction — is the topic of the final objection to deflationism that we will discuss.

然而，无论人们对Wright的反驳的细节有何看法，它的确对紧缩论产生了深远的影响。该反驳迫使我们考虑，膨胀的和紧缩的真理论之间可能没有非常明确的区别。事实上，这种可能性——膨胀/紧缩论之间没有明确的区别——是我们将讨论的对紧缩论的最后的反驳的主题。

7.6 Objection #6: Inflationist Deflationism? 膨胀的紧缩论？

The final objection begins by drawing attention to a little known doctrine about truth that G.E. Moore held at the beginning of the century. Richard Cartwright describes the view as follows: “a true proposition is one that has a certain simple unanalyzable property, and a false proposition is one that lacks the property” (1987, p. 73). This doctrine about truth is, of course, to be understood as the analogue for truth of the doctrine that Moore held about good, namely that good is a simple, unanalyzable quality.

最后的反驳始于摩尔在20世纪初提出的一个不太知名的关于真的教条。Richard Cartwright如此描述该观点：“一个真命题拥有一个简单的、不可被进一步分析的属性，而一个错误的命题缺少该属性。” (1987, p. 73) 当然，这种关于真的教条应被理解为摩尔关于善的教条的类似物，即善是一种简单的，无法分析的属性。

The problem that this Moorean view about truth presents for the deflationary theory might best be expressed in the form of a question: what is the difference between the Moorean view and deflationism? Of course, there is a sense in which the flavour of the Moorean view is very different from the flavour of the deflationist theory about truth. After all, what could be more inflationary than thinking that truth is a property of a proposition that is unanalyzable? Certainly Moore's view about good has been viewed in this light. However, the fact that one view has a different flavour from another does not mean that, at bottom, they are not the same view. One might perhaps suggest that, according to the deflationary theory, the concept of truth has an important logical role, i.e., to capture generalizations. However, this doesn't really answer our question. For one thing, it isn't clear that Moore's notion might not also capture generalizations. For another, the idea that the deflationary concept of truth plays an important logical role doesn't distinguish the metaphysics of deflationism from the metaphysics of the Moorean view; and it is the metaphysics of the matter that the present objection really brings into focus. Alternatively, one might suggest that the distinction between truth according to deflationism and truth according to Moore's view is the distinction between having a simple unanalyzable nature, and not having a nature at all. However, what is that distinction? It is certainly not obvious that there is any distinction between having a nature about which nothing can be said and having no nature at all.

摩尔式的关于真的观点对紧缩论提出的问题，最好被表述为这个问题的形式：在摩尔式的观点和紧缩论之间存在什么区别？当然，某种意义上，摩尔式观点的风格与真之紧缩论的风格大相径庭。毕竟，有什么比认为真是命题所拥有的、不可分析的属性更膨胀的观点了呢？就如摩尔已经被阐明清楚的关于善的观点那样。但是，一个观点与另一个观点具有不同的风格这一事实并不意味着从根本上说它们不是同一观点。也许有人认为，根据紧缩论，真的概念具有重要的逻辑作用，即把握普遍表达。但这并不真的回答了我们的问题。一方面，并不清楚摩尔的观点能否把握概况。另一方面，真的概念具有重要的逻辑作用的观点并没有将紧缩论与摩尔的观点在形而上学上区分开；而正是形而上学带来了这个反驳。作为代替，有人可能会说，摩尔的观点和紧缩论之间的区别在于，前者认为存在一个简单的、不可分析的本质，而后者认为不存在本质。但是，这种区别是什么？显然，存在无法言说的本质，和不存在本质，这两者之间有什么区别，这是很不清楚的。

The problem is particularly acute in light of the fact that deflationism has often been discussed in the context of various claims about reductionism. In many discussions of deflationism, for example, the opponent is assumed to be a particular version of a correspondence theory that attempts to reduce the correspondence relation to certain relations of causation (Field 1986 is a good example). However, it should be noted that this kind of view is also opposed to the kind of position that takes semantic facts-such as a proposition's being true-as primitive (Field 1972 is a good example). And the problem that we are considering for deflationism is that these two views are not simply identical in being opposed to the kind of view that explains correspondence in terms of causation: it is that they are identical simpliciter. The suggestion, in short, is that deflationism is identical to what initially seems to be its complete opposite, Moorean inflationism.

鉴于我们经常在各种还原论主张的语境下讨论紧缩论，这一问题尤为尖锐。例如，在许多关于紧缩论的讨论中，反对立场被假设为尝试把符合关系还原到特定的因果关系上的符合论(Field 1986)。但应该注意的是，这种观点也与以语义事实（例如，命题的真）为初始的立场相反(Field 1972)。我们在此处考虑的关于紧缩论的问题是，这两种紧缩论的观点并不简单的等同于这一观点，即反对将符合关系解释为因果关系的观点：换言之，它们如果被简化的话，这些紧缩论的观点与（将符合论视为因果关系的）观点是等同的。简而言之，这表明紧缩论与乍看似乎与其完全相反的摩尔式膨胀论是等同的。

The decision to be an inflationist or a deflationist about truth has been called “the biggest decision a theorist of truth must make” (Boghossian 1990). Certainly this is true at an intuitive level. But it is sobering also to realize that it is not exactly clear what this decision amounts to when subjected to philosophical scrutiny. And this suggests that there is still a lot of work to be done before we can arrive at a final evaluation of the deflationary theory of truth.

成为一个关于真的膨胀论者还是紧缩论者，被认为是“一个真理论家所必须做出的最为重大的决定” (Boghossian 1990)。从直觉上讲，这当然是正确的。但一旦进行哲学审查，我们就会很清醒地意识到，这个决定到底意味着什么还不是很清楚。这表明，在对真之紧缩论进行最终的评估之前，还有许多工作要做。