Kant on Necessity and Teleological Causation

My aim in this note is to give an intepretation of the "Analytic of Teleological Judgment," which I have repeatedly found to be the most challenging section of the third Critique. I believe a very helpful strategy is to see Kant as discussing various models of causation, and as giving an argument for why a speific kind of teleological causation is at once (1) theoretically preferable, (2) epistemologically unavoidable, (3) explanatorily redundant, (4) exploritorily regulatory in empirically judgments.

1. Four models of causation:

To make sense of Kant’s rather abstruse presentations in this section, I believe it is important to distinguish four kinds of causal series, conceptually demanding in the increasing order.

(1). Purely contingent, mechanical causal series. Among all possible causal series, a particular causal series comes to be purely by chance. There is no reason explaining its necessity.

(2). Mechanical causal series necessitated merely by the end, with no fixation at each intermediate position. It is determined, for example, that a certain causal series must necessarily lead to a specific end, e. We can thus isolate an (unbounded) set of possible series, all leading to e. But which specific series within this set is actualized is, once again, purely by chance.

(3). Mechanical causal series necessitated by the end, with fixation at each intermediate position. It is determined not only that a certain causal series must lead to a specific end e, but each specific intermediate cause/effect within this series is also fixed. There will be only one series that satisfies this condition, and this single series is necessary, actualized by no chance.

(4). The same series described in (3), except that the series is not merely mechanical, but also in a way organic: “a thing exists as a natural end if it is cause and effect of itself (p.243)”

I believe Kant’s intent in the Analytic is to show that the a priori principle of purposiveness of our power of judgment compels us, in empirical judgments, to go beyond (1); but neither (2) nor (3) are satisfactory; (4) is, but only used regulatorily.

(2) is discussed in terms of “relative purposiveness”, in contrast to “internal purposiveness” (§63). When we observe a mechanical causal event, e.g. when the river causes the flourishing of plants, we might be driven by the principle of purposiveness to conclude that the flourishing of plants is the end of the river. In this case, the river is “useful” for something external; it has relative purposiveness in that it is merely useful, i.e. can be used as a material, for something else; in other words, the river is not purposive in itself. Should the flourishing of plants be caused by some other elements, i.e., so long the end if fulfilled by some other possible means, then the existence of river can be easily dispensed of. But “this, however, can never made out by mere contemplation of nature; thus it follows that relative purposiveness, although it give hypothetical indication of natural ends, nevertheless justifies no absolute teleological judgments. (241)” If teleological judgment about relative purposiveness were justified, then we would have to have cognition of the final end, i.e. the end point of a causal series; but this final end cannot be an object of empirical cognition. This is because the causal series is indefinite, and in empirical cognition, we should not expect the termination of a causal series (to delve into the pure reason, cf. 3rd antinomy). In a different context, Kant claims that “for the latter assertion we need not only the concept of a possible end, but also cognition of the final end of nature, which requires the relation of nature to something supersensible (p.250)” He is clear that the final end of nature is in principle supersensible. To terminate the causal series at the flourishing of plants, for example, is merely arbitrary, since the flourishing of plants continues to cause other objects. (Things are different in the practical realm, where we have to assume our freedom and initiate causal sequence with reference to an end of our action; but let us suspend the issue; see p.244.)

Both (3) and (4) necessitates a single causal series, hence also the position of every single object within a particular causal series: there isn’t left any space of chance or contingency. I think it is this idea underlying Kant’s obscure comment. “Since reason must be able to cognize the necessity in every form of a natural product if it would understand the conditions connected with its generation, the contingency of their form with respect to all empirical laws of nature in relation to reason is itself a ground for regarding their causality as if it were possible only through reason. (p.242)” The second half of the sentence can be confusing and seems contradict my reading regarding necessity. But one way of reading it is [the contingency of their form with respect to all empirical laws of nature] [in relation to reason] is itself a ground for regarding their causality. “Contingent” is read as “contingent upon”: that the form of each single thing and the corresponding natural laws (that describe empirical causal series) are contingent upon reason and hence necessary, not that they themselves are contingent. The language in the example of a hexagon on the beach also reflects my suspicion above. “If someone were to perceive a geometrical figure, for instance a regular hexagon, his reflection, working with a concept of it … would not be able to judge as a ground of the possibility of such a shape the sand, the nearby see, the wind, … or any other nonrational cause, because the contingency of coinciding with such a concept … would seem to him so infinitely great that it would be just as good as if there were no natural law of nature. (p.242)” If “continency” is again read as “contingency upon”, then this sentence conveys that the shape’s contingency/dependence upon reason is so great that it transcends the mere contingent and mechanical causal laws of nature.

(3) is presented most vividly in the example of the watch. “In a watch one part is the instrument for the motion of another, but one wheel is not the efficient cause for the production of the other; one part is certainly present for the sake of the other but not because of it. (p.246)” When the artisan produces a watch, he must, before the production, have a concept of the watch as a whole containing the rules and designs by which the different parts of the watch coordinate and cause the movement of other parts. Once the creation is done in accordance with the concept, the parts of the watch merely effect on each other mechanically, each as efficient cause, and each is effected by others. This kind of causal nexus indeed falls under the description that “each thing is both a cause and effect.” And each part is indeed purposive (they are purposively designed, after all), since one part is in service of all other parts (one part fails to work, other parts cannot function effectively and the watch as a whole fails to function). But, as Kant acutely notes, the part is not the efficient cause of the production of the other part (each part is the cause/effect of the movement of other parts, not the existence of other parts); the artisan is. When one part broken, the watch itself cannot generate a substitute; only the artisan could fix the issue. If the causal series of our world indeed is like (3) and functions like a watch, which is indeed necessitated, we then must assume a certain creator outside the causal series, who takes the role of the artisan and designs and produces each element of the causal sequence. This picture would be compatible with either creationism (God only creates the initial states of beings and the causal law, and these initial beings necessarily proceeds causally), conservationism, concurrentism, or the Leibnizian pre-established harmony. But Kant has reason to reject this picture, as we will see.

Only in (4) would each objects in the causal series natural ends. In such a causal nexus, each element is not only the cause/effect of the movement of other parts, but the existence/production of other parts. They are natural ends, since they posit no being outside the causal series in nature.

2. Natural ends over divine creation

(3) and (4) differs only with regard to the creative power/productive power of the causal series, and their difference corresponds to the noumena/phenomena distinction. (3) attributes the productive power to a transcendent, supersensible being, whereas (4) attributes it to nature itself; both cannot be given in intuition, God or nature as a whole, but they stay at different ontological levels. Kant’s reason to prefer (4) over (3), as it seems to me, is to protect the integrity of this ontological boundary, which reflects his general claim of epistemic modesty. “The expression ‘and end of nature’ is already enough to preclude the confusion so that there is no mix-up between natural science and the occasion it provides for the teleological judging of its object /and/ the consideration of God, and thus a theological derivation ..,. we must carefully and modestly restrict ourselves to the expression that says only exactly as much as we know, namely that of an end of nature. (253)” Teleological judgments are empirical judgments about objects in the experience, hence is in the realm of phenomena. Kant insists this point repeatedly. “We discovered in nature a capacity [productive power] for bringing froth products that can only be conceived by us in accordance with the concept of final causes. (p.252)” “As for what occasions it, this principle is of course to be derived from experience, that is, experience of the kind that is methodically undertaken and is called observation. (p.248)” In judgments of experience, in other words, introducing the idea of God would be abusing the pure reason.

3. The regulative use of teleological concepts

The concept of natural ends, and its corresponding principle of internal purposiveness/teleology, can only be used as regulative. Compare this with formal purposiveness in aesthetic judgment, where no concept is involved: in both instance, Kant’s aims is to ensure that purposiveness is not used determinately. In aesthetic judgment this is easily achieved: if only concepts can determine intuition, when there is no intuition, nothing is determining. Concepts, however, are either determining or regulative; by means of elimination, the concepts of natural ends have to be regulative. But sometimes Kant seems running into inconsistency.

“But the universality and necessity that it asserts of such a purposiveness cannot rest merely on grounds in experience, but must have as its ground some sort of a priori principle, even if it is merely regulative and even if that end lies only in the idea of the one who judges and never in any efficient cause. (p.248)”

“It might always be possible that in, e.g., an animal body, many parts could be conceived as consequences of merely mechanical laws. Yet the cause that provides the appropriate material, modifies it, forms it, and deposits it in its appropriate place must always be judged teleologically, so that everything in it must be considered as organized, and everything is also, in a certain relation to the thing itself, an organ in turn. (p.249)”

“Whereas in the case of the empirical laws of natural ends in organized beings it is not merely permissible but is even unavoidable to use the teleological way of judging as the principle of the theory of nature with regard to a special class of its objects (p.254)”

It seems hard to reconcile how the principle of teleology/natural ends can be at once regulatory (from bottom up, inductive, fallible, via experience) and a priori (independently from experience; necessary, unavoidable), at least with regard to a certain class of objects (organic living beings, supposedly). I believe a few observations might be helpful:

[1]. Mechanical causal explanations, that according to model (1), is explanatorily sufficient with regard to the phenomenal nature. The movements of animals, even, could be mechanically explained. Principle of teleology and natural ends are therefore explanatorily redundant.

[2]. Principle of teleology is regulatory not with regard to the properties of objects, but with regard to scientific research. Principle of teleology, more specifically, does not function as a regulatory principle in empirical science (e.g. all birds have caved bones), which usually contain description of properties ascribable to objects and thereby explain the objects (e.g. why birds can effectively counter gravity) This point is more perspicuous with the above point: natural ends do not explain movements of objects (including animals), since causal mechanism is alone satisfactory.

[1] and [2] seems being reflected by this quote: “Teleological judging is rightly drawn into our research into nature, at least problematically, but only in order to bring it under principles of observation and research in analogy with causality according to ends, without presuming thereby to explain it. (p.234)”

[3]. To say that the principle of teleology has an a priori principle as its ground (as p.248) is not to say that the principle of teleology itself is a priori. The a priori grounding principle is the principle of purposiveness of the faculty power of judgment, which does not at all entitle us to take concepts as end as determinative a priori, as the categories; nor the principle of teleology, as the transcendental principle of mechanical causation.

This point is supported thus: “The latter is consequently an entirely natural effect of that purposiveness observed in the essence of things (as appearances), which also cannot be criticized insofar as the compatibility of that form of sensible intuition (which is called space) with the faculty of concepts (the understanding) is not only inexplicable for us insofar as it is precisely thus and not otherwise, but also enlarges the mind, allowing it, as it were, to suspect something lying beyond those sensible representation, in which, although unknown to us, the ultimate ground of that accord could be found. Indeed, it is not necessary [the a priori principle of purposiveness of faculty of judgment does not lead to the explanatorily necessary principle of teleology] for us to known this if it is merely a matter of the formal purposiveness of our a priori presentations; but even just being compelled [but it compels us to necessarily pose such a principle of teleology] to look into that direction fills us with admiration for the object that forces us to do so. (p.238)”[1]

Hence, when Kant claims that the principle of teleology is unavoidable and a priori, he is saying, given 3, that it is unavoidable, given the a priori principle of purposiveness of the faculty of judgment, for us to pose the principle teleology, esp. in judgments of animals that aptly occasions such judgments; not the a priority of teleology itself. [Not very sure of the following] And when Kant claims that the principle of teleology is regulative, it is regulative for us to find various universal scientific principle that subsumes particular objects; not that the principle of teleology itself is regulative and necessarily ascribable to objects. Once we hold to this principle, then a singular object must be determined with a whole: teleology guides us to look for the determinate content of this whole, not to regard teleology itself as this whole.

[1] I believe this quote also supports the faculty a weak accidentalism between Understanding and Sensibility: we cannot know any substratum underlying their accord and make their cooperation necessary; thus we cannot rule out accidentalism and have a justified essentialism. But, insofar as we have the faculty of judgment, we have to assume them as in united in an accord/substratum, which accord/substratum is not justified.